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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, transnational practices conducted by Haitian 
immigrants had a profound effect on the tumultuous transition of the Haitian 
government.  In his efforts to foster the ti legliz movement, Jean-Bertrand Aristide 
essentially reshaped notions of territorial citizenship and political participation.  As Glick 
Schiller and Fouron (1998: 135) write, “…Aristide broke with classic definitions of the 
bourgeois democratic nation-state in only one sphere – he redefined the location of 
state so it was no longer confined within the territorial boundaries of Haiti.” Guarnizo 
and Fouron (1998) “define their…emigrating populations as part and parcel of their 
nation states” (131)   
In his Lavalas’ Project of Government, a document Aristide published during his 
presidential campaign, he overtly recruited Haitians living abroad to support his 
movement.  In doing so, he reshaped his political power to encompass all native 
Haitians, regardless of where they might reside.  In order to institutionalize these 
overtures, Aristide actually met with members of the Haitian diaspora and publicly 
claimed that they were, “no longer outside of Haiti although living abroad.”  (Richman, 
1992; Jean-Pierre, 1994; as cited in Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1998:136)  By actively 
seeking assistance from the diaspora, Aristide garnered widespread support during his 
time of exile.  This had several key political effects:  (1) Haitians living abroad lobbied 
their home government in an effort to restore Aristide to power; (2)  Haitians living 
abroad attempted to influence their family and friends living in Haiti to pressure the 
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Haitian government; and (3) Haitians living in the United States supported Aristide’s 
efforts to gain favor with the U.S. government and subsequently, made efforts to sway 
U.S. foreign policy regarding Haiti.   
Aristide went so far as to appoint a Chef de Mission to serve as direct attaché to 
the Haitian consulate in New York.  This only further institutionalized the Haitian 
diaspora, and cemented its place in Haitian politics although acting from abroad.  
Haitians in New York were mobilized.  They acted on behalf of the Haitian government, 
even going so far as to demonstrate publicly when one key tenth Department official 
(Wilson Desir) died.   It was an action that amounted to as much as a “state funeral.” 
(Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1998:138)   
Efforts within the U.S. receiving communities to mobilize the Haitian diaspora 
took on a decidedly ethnic flair (Glick Schiller 1975, 1977 and Glick Schiller and Fouron, 
1998).  “The word was communicated through political speeches, patronage, ethnic 
festivals, invitations to City Hall, and in the case of Haitian organizations, funding from 
city, state, federal and philanthropic agencies.  Haitian immigrants were invited to join 
the Mayor’s Commission on Ethnic Affairs. They were also encouraged to organize 
support groups for mayoral candidates and to cast their votes for politicians who spoke 
to the Caribbean immigrant experience.” (Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1998).  In these 
instances, we see the establishment of a transnational political identity that is directly 
linked to participation in the political institutions of the receiving community.   
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The use of these mechanisms only escalated.  U.S. political candidates went so far as to 
suggest that to obtain U.S. citizenship and vote in U.S. elections was a means by which 
Haitian residents of the United States could help influence electoral outcomes in Haiti.  
(Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1998)   
Although various efforts to incorporate the Haitian diaspora into U.S. and Haitian 
politics succeeded at further entrenching a sense of interconnectedness with the 
homeland, there were discursive effects as well.  Glick Schiller and Fouron (1998) 
enumerate them as follows, paraphrased here:  (1)  Homeland dependency on 
remittances from the diaspora spawned resentment.  The homeland Haitians were 
resentful of perceived prosperity of the diaspora; at the same time, the diaspora grew 
increasingly resentful of the “burden” of remitting a substantial portion of their income 
back home; (2)  Those who stayed behind in Haiti felt increasingly threatened by the 
prospect of a repatriated diaspora that had developed an increased professional skill 
base and language competency since they had departed; (3) Divin over the potential 
privatization was spot-lighted – diaspora thinks that privatizing utilities in Haiti will allow 
them better job prospects if they return, and families receiving remittances support this 
as well.  However, families lacking assistance, see this as an expensive development in 
an already financially stressed existence.  They would pay more for less, in a sense.   
Politically, the experience of the diaspora came to bear as well.  The personal 
disjuncture described above lead to the creation of political cleavages.  (Glick Schiller 
and Fouron, 1998:153).  Economic effects, political leadership, position on policy, etc.   
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In his study of Haitian migrants, Laguerre (2006) suggests that the diaspora is itself a 
“transnational political system,” maintained by structures within the homeland and 
receiving community.  He argues that this super-structure allows diasporic refugees to 
shift their political engagements from the home system to the receiving system, 
depending on what goals the diaspora seeks to attain throughout its evolution.   He 
writes:   
With regard to the role of place or location in diasporic politics, we will see 
how different relations with different segments of the diaspora depend on 
the nature of the political process in either site or the projected goal 
contemplated. A specific diasporic site may be called upon for help by the 
homeland government to achieve a specific outcome, while another site 
may be contacted for a different reason. Similarly, a specific hostland 
government may at times use the services of the local diaspora in its 
diplomatic and trade relations with the homeland, while at other times it 
may simply ignore such cosmopolitan political actors. 
 
 This process of political bargaining plays out rather simply, although it occurs 
across a complex plane.  Laguerre’s diasporic populations exerted pressure on the 
Haitian government from their position in their U.S. receiving community.  They do this 
via mechanisms available to them in the receiving community, especially if the receiving 
community is democratic, such as diplomatic appeals, pubic demonstration, and 
mobilization of the diaspora toward some specific political aim.  They do this also by 
communicating directly their efforts and progress back to their social network within 
the homeland with potential for either positive or negative reaction by the home 
government. Put plainly, “Diasporic politicians operate inside diasporic organizations, 
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inside the formal organizations of the sending and receiving states, and within the 
transnational tentacles of the political institutions of the homeland and the host land.  
At times, they use one institution (e.g., the Democratic Party in the United States) to 
consolidate another (the electoral process in the homeland),” (Laguerre, 2006: 3).  For 
example, the Haitian diaspora in the United States actually used their numbers to garner 
political influence and expertise from US and Haitian officials working within the United 
Nations and the US government.  They later returned to Haiti empowered to form 
coalitions that could leverage real political change.  Laguerre labels this a “transnational 
stretch of state institution” (2006:3). Others have gone so far as to describe these 
outcomes of transnational political action as the emergence of some sort of post-state, 
a sphere of action and influence that transcends both domestic and international 
political arenas (Basch et al, 1994).  In particular, instances of ex-patriate voting 
illustrate the blurring of traditional political boundaries.  Al-Ali (2001) points Eritrean 
voting numbers during the 1993 Referendum for Independence whereby a total of 
84,370 citizens voted while living outside of Eritrea.   
Sladjan arrived in New York Laguardia Airport at 15 years old, a refugee of the 
1990s ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia.  He maintains both US and Bosnian 
citizenship.  Although he has lived in the United States for 14 years, he keeps close ties 
with friends and family still living in the Bosnian city in which he was born.  He travels to 
Bosnia and Croatia at least once every year, some years more frequently.  Although in 
his view he does not participate in Bosnian political affairs in any overt fashion, he 
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admits to using the social networking website Facebook to monitor other Bosnian’s 
views on political events that occur in Bosnia and express his opinions about Bosnian 
political events.  Sladjan explained that he belongs to a “political” Facebook forum 
called “REVOLT!”   Most “REVOLT!” members are young – age 18 to 30,  and the 
majority indicate they live in Bosnia.  Discussion threads typically spotlight complaints 
about the Bosnian government, Bosnian politicians or such issues as community policing 
and corruption.  Sladjan describes REVOLT! as “some sort of a political movement.”  
When I asked him why he takes interest in the group or Bosnian political affairs for that 
matter, Sladjan replied, “At the end of the day, Bosnia is home.  I don’t consider myself 
to be a man of one country.”   
 Edi, an Albanian political asylee, relocated to the United States in 1994.  He 
openly describes himself as “politically active” with respect to issues affecting the 
Albanian population residing in Southeastern Michigan, and he uses various political 
channels to affect policy changes that would improve the circumstance of ethnic 
Albanians locally.  However, his political activism transcends local boundaries.  Recently, 
Edi and several of his colleagues wrote letters to their U.S. Congressional representative, 
requesting that the Member take a stand against the Albanian government’s prolonged 
detainment of two political prisoners.  In response, their Congressman sent letters to 
officials in the Albanian government requesting the prisoners’ release.  About two 
weeks after I interviewed him, Edi met with the same U.S. Congressman and a retired 
U.S. Army General (and former contender for the Democratic Party’s presidential 
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nomination) at an event hosting several thousand ethnic Albanians residing in Suburban 
Detroit.  Discussion topics included the most recent Presidential election in Albania, the 
Albanian economy, Albania’s bid for membership in the European Union (EU), and U.S. 
immigration and citizenship reform. 
Milosh, a twenty-five year old Kosovar refugee, also maintains a substantive 
connection with his homeland.  He explained, “It’s basically how I was raised.  I have 
very close ties with extended family, like uncles, aunts, and first cousins.  There is also 
the fact that I’ve gone so often – I go every summer and stay for extended periods of 
time, like four to six weeks every summer, so that has helped.  And with that…it feels 
like as if I’ve never left there.”  He went on to describe his sense of duality about being 
from Kosovo but carving out a life in the United States, “A lot of people tell you that 
they’re physically here, but their heart and soul is there.  That is how I feel, and it is 
because of these connections.  It does not have to do anything with the U.S. being bad 
to me or having something done negative to me – it’s the complete opposite.  I am who 
I am.  Part of it is because I have lived in the U.S., and I’ve become a better person living 
in the U.S.  But I feel an emotional connection to Kosovo.  It is one of the reasons I plan 
on keeping dual citizenship.”  Milosh’s connection to his homeland also has turned 
toward the political.  He said that he is involved in U.S. political affairs and Kosovar 
political affairs simultaneously and to the same degree.  Interestingly, when I asked him 
to provide an example of a political action he completed with respect to Kosovar 
politics, he discussed a U.S. protest he attended on behalf of Macedonian political 
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prisoners.  Milosh explained, “The protest was about wanting a fair trial for 
Montenegrins suspected of terrorism in Montenegro – domestic terrorism…It was a 
protest in D.C.  We wanted to make sure that the U.S. required and asked and pressured 
the Montenegro government to give a fair and speedy trial to the 14 that were accused, 
three of which were U.S. citizens.” 
I am interested in understanding these political actions as a relevant component 
of contemporary transnationalism.  Ever-increasing international migration rates 
coupled with enhanced technology and accessible transportation have created a venue 
for more transnational political action than ever before.  Although migrants have always 
sustained some tie with their homeland, there is more opportunity than ever to commit 
political actions remotely from the receiving community that have a political effect on 
structures in a distant homeland.  When political actions are committed en mass, as 
with many diasporas, they can have tangible political effects in both sending and 
receiving communities.  For example, absentee voting and political party contributions 
from exiles living afar can influence sending state election results.  This pattern of 
affecting political outcomes in absentia holds important implications for our 
understanding of the bounded nation-state and traditional political structures.  As Levitt 
et al (2003) argue, “Because migrants' local political agency and institutions are shaped 
not only by local discourses and modes of organization but also by global factors such as 
rights regimes, traditional ideas about political transparency and accountability need to 
be revisited.”  
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More specifically, I am interested in how the presence of conflict in the sending 
state may or may not affect migrants’ ability and desire to act in the political spheres of 
both the sending and receiving states. Conflict migrants typically depart their homeland 
as refugees.  They leave with little time preparation, scant opportunities to establish 
support systems to receive them post-resettlement, and often would not have chosen 
to relocate had conflict not forced them.  Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003) writes of the 
consequences of forced migration.  Omitting implications for population size and 
economic capital, I paraphrase her conclusions:  1.) Forced migration changes migrants’ 
collective self-perception and their perceptions of others, which in turn, influences in- 
and out-group relations; 2.) Being forced to leave one’s homeland creates a new chapter 
in a culture’s shared memories and historical experiences.  This shapes the group’s 
“value orientations and behavior patterns.” 3) Forced migration effects domestic politics 
and international relations within and between states.  How then does their status as 
conflict migrants affect political action and outcomes in sending and receiving 
communities?  To which political structure, if any, do conflict migrants belong?  And 
how does their political activism or withdrawal compare to that of migrants who chose 
to relocate and as such, prepared for their resettlement? 
Interstate migration is understood most simply as a human activity resulting in a 
shift of primary residence from one nation or state to another.  But as Sladjan, Edi and 
Milosh demonstrate, much has changed since the “old” migration of the early Twentieth 
Century.  Levitt et all (2003) explain, “Today, new technologies of communication and 
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transportation allow migrants to sustain more frequent, less expensive, and more 
intimate connections than before. Such technologies enable migrants to remain active 
in their sending communities more regularly and influentially than in the past.” While 
bifocal existence is not entirely new, increased access to the homeland post-
resettlement offers increased opportunity for political action and potential for much 
more profound results.  Additionally, increased tolerance of dual citizenship by both 
sending and receiving states allows migrants to institutionalize their dual political 
actions. 
Unprecedented advancements in communications and transportation 
technology have availed today’s migrants the opportunity to trade home for home, 
place for place.  We can gather up-to-the-minute information about faraway places with 
remarkable accuracy, and if we choose, we can remain consistently involved in the 
social and political spheres of more than one “homeland.”  Truly, individuals are no 
longer tied to one locality, one set of institutions, and even one legal citizenship status.  
When contemporary migrants choose to engage in a transnational existence, the 
possibilities for influence on both home and receiving communities are quite profound.  
Today’s transnationalism results in transformed identities, new networks, and multi-
level social, economic and political action.  (Glick Schiller et al, 1992)  This challenges our 
evaluation of contemporary interstate movement and its effects on sending and 
receiving states.  Portes and Rumbaut (2006: 13) write, “…[immigration] theories coined 
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in the wake of the European’s arrival at the turn of the century have been made largely 
obsolete by events during these last decades.” 
Although there is a robust literature reviewing transnationalism, we lack 
adequate understanding of transnational political opportunity structures, especially for 
migrants, and the degree to which migrants choose to (or are able to) engage politically 
in their home and receiving communities, along with any resulting effects on politics in 
either locale.  Additionally, we need to understand that differences in departure and 
arrival conditions may influence political behavior.  The element of force or 
“involuntariness” that exists for refugees creates a set of circumstances at departure 
and throughout resettlement that is different than those experienced by other migrants.  
How might these differences in departure conditions influence migrants’ political 
behavior in their home and receiving communities?  Do they choose to participate more 
frequently in the homeland or receiving community?   What other factors influence their 
behavior? 
The field lacks comparative views in this regard as well.  Since I am interested in 
how conflict affects migration experiences and resultant political behavior, I compare 
conflict and non-conflict migrant activity.  I conduct within-group comparisons to 
examine first whether refugees participate in politics more so in their homeland or 
receiving community.  I then compare political behavior among refugees and non-
conflict migrants to assess between-group differences in transnational participation.   
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Although previous research seeks to understand various social and economic 
differences between forced and voluntary migrants groups, this is the first such study 
employing comparative statistical methods to assess differences in political behavior.  
This is unique also in that I focus on three distinct migration flows from the Balkan 
region – Bosnians, Kosovars and Albanians who migrated to the United States between 
1990 and 2009.  I selected these groups for several reasons: (1) They departed the same 
region of the world within the same time period; (2) I located a U.S. community in which 
all three groups had established significant enclaves; (3) All groups heralded from post-
Communist societies; (4) Conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo displaced people within those 
jurisdictions during the 1990s.  While conflict also affected ethnic Albanians residing in 
Albania during the Kosovar conflict, conflict did not displace any of the respondents to 
whom I spoke who had resided in Albania.  All of the Bosnians and Kosovars with whom 
I spoke relocated to the United States with refugee status.  All of the Albanian 
participants (from Albania - excluding those Albanians from Kosovo) entered with 
immigration status pertaining to work or education.  
Migrants occupy different types of political space depending on their migration 
experience, amount of social capital, and degree of incorporation in both societies.  
Those migrants who relocate for labor or educational opportunities likely have different 
assets and attitudes than migrants who were forced to relocate due to conflict.  Put 
simply, I suggest that with respect to political participation, (1) conflict migrants are 
more engaged in their sending state than in their receiving state; and (2) conflict 
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migrants participate more in the sending state than migrants whose movement was 
driven by other factors.  In other words, conflict-driven migrants occupy a greater 
transnational political space than “voluntary” migrants, or those migrants who relocated 
due to economic, educational other factors typically deemed within their domain.  The 
aspect of choice in relocation suggests that voluntary migrants may be more apt to turn 
away from politics in the home state in favor of forging a new political identity that 
compliments their motivations for relocation, be those motivations familial, 
professional, educational, etc. 
In order to ground this effort within an existing theoretical framework, I devote 
Chapter 2 to reviewing literature conceptualizing globalization, nationalism, and 
transnationalism.  I discuss also transnational communities and diasporas.  I then 
summarize efforts toward understanding transnational political participation and the 
factors that influence transnational political action.   Within this, it is important also to 
review work highlighting the role sending and receiving states play in determining 
migrants’ access to political institutions and ability to incorporate in both communities.   
I conclude Chapter 2 with a discussion of the Haitian diaspora as an illustrative example 
of contemporary transnational political phenomena.  This well-documented case 
illuminates the complexity of transnational political participation, and provides further 
justification for my rational and approach.  In Chapter 3, I explain my research approach 
and study methodology, including definition of variables and statistical tests.  I devote 
Chapter 4 to   describing the research population.  Chapter 5 summarizes results related 
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to my first hypothesis, and in Chapter 6, I summarize my second hypothesis.  In Chapter 
7, I review results and place them within the existing literature framework.   
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CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW 
   
Since 1970, worldwide international migration has more than doubled.  
According to the United Nations, in 2010 there were approximately 214 million people 
residing in a country other than where they were born.  From 2005 to 2010 alone, the 
number of international migrants rose by 12 percent, or 23 million people.  Most 
migrants sought shores of more developed regions including European Union (EU) 
countries, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.  But the United States led the pack with a 
3.2 percent increase in the number of migrants received every year since 1990. The 
United States is home to the largest number of international migrants of any country in 
the world -- some 42.8 million foreign-born residents, or 20 percent of the world’s 
international migrants.1   Foreign-born residents accounted for nearly 12 percent of the 
total U.S. population reported by the U.S. Census Bureau.2   
Not only is today’s migrant flow growing, but it is more diverse than the migrant 
streams of just 50 years ago.  Whereas turn-of-the-century U.S. immigrants were largely 
from European countries, immigrants now arrive in the United States from every region 
of the world, from every nation imaginable.  Departing both developed and developing 
countries, today’s migrants come forth from a broader spectrum of economic and social 
circumstances than those who came before them.   
                                                           
1
 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division 17, International 
Migration Report 2009: A Global Assessment  
2
 Luke J. Larsen, The Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2003, Current Population Reports, P20-
551, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, D.C. 
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Yet amid transition, one constant remains.  For as long as people have crossed-
borders, so too have they maintained a connection to home.  Weber (1978: 388) wrote 
of “heimatsgefühl” – translated literally as “home feeling,” but referring to memories of 
home.  This nostalgia or longing for the “old ways” persists in migrant’s lives long after 
resettlement, even after repatriation becomes unlikely. 
Naturally, most migrants thus experience some sense of duality.  This might 
manifest in frequent trips back to the homeland, support sent to family and friends via 
financial remittances, and even first-hand participation in political and social life abroad. 
Contemporary technological innovations foster greater access to information about the 
homeland, more communication with homeland networks, and new modes of 
institutional participation.  By allowing departed subjects to maintain dual citizenship, 
many states have softened their borders and redefined political participation structures 
to include expatriates.  Such multi-faced access to the homeland has led to new 
opportunities for transnational awareness, interactions, activities and identities.  As 
such, our notions of political space and incorporation are ever-evolving.  Glick Schiller 
and Fouron (1998) write:   
There is something within the experience of being a transmigrant 
that does transcend borders and boundaries both of the state and of the 
conceptual terrain mapped by states.  To be forced to migrate from your 
home with a dream of a better life, to confront difficult economic 
conditions and racism instead of a world of prosperity and security, and 
to map out transnational connections as a strategy of personal and 
cultural survival is to enter a realm not totally penetrated by dominant 
ideas and practices. 
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What does having a transnational existence mean for migrants’ desire and ability 
to become political actors?   Do migrants have opportunities to act politically in one or 
both of their affiliated communities?  And if opportunities are present, do they seek to 
participate or to withdraw?  Truly no two migration experiences are the same.  Foner 
(1997:23) writes, “some groups are likely to be more transnational than others – and we 
need research that explores and explains the differences.  Within immigrant groups, 
there is also variation in the frequency, depth and range of transnational ties.” So, it is 
unlikely that tendencies toward or away from transnational political activities are the 
same for all migrants.  What are these variances, and what causes them?   
Given differences in departure conditions, it stands to reason that migrants who 
were forced from their homeland may exhibit different political behavior than migrants 
driven by labor and educational opportunities. Wood (1994) suggests the experiences of 
forced and voluntary migrants are similar.  He includes among their shared challenges, 
“…declining real incomes, and large personal investments in the migration process; 
disparities of incomes and opportunities between the place of origin and potential 
destinations; kinship networks that provide critical information and support; new 
experiences of ethnic tension and discrimination as an ‘outsider’; loss of traditional 
social status; new educational and language barriers; and weakening of traditional 
values in the face of powerful, foreign cultural forces.”  However, I point to differences 
in financial and social capital, lack of pre-migration planning and preparation and the 
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trauma of forced migration as factors likely producing a marked difference between 
conflict and non-conflict migrants.     
To explore these ideas further, I first review literature examining migration 
generally as well as the accepted typology describing different types of migrants.  I then 
conceptualize transnationalism within the context of globalization, and I define 
transnational communities and diasporas.  I review literature discussing transnational 
political participation, highlighting factors known to influence transnational political 
participation.   
Modern Migration  
 The essential construct within migration theory is the simple “push-pull” 
dichotomy (Ravenstein, 1889).   Ravenstein proposed that such internal factors as poor 
economic conditions, political instability, and oppression “push” people to migrate.  
External opportunities such as better job markets and improved living conditions act 
concurrently to “pull” people away.   Ensuing theory expounds on the push-pull process, 
laying the framework for contemporary world systems approaches.  A neo-classical 
macroeconomic approach views voluntary movement as the result of a choice between 
wage differentials in the sending and receiving communities.  Put simply, if wages 
abroad are higher than wages at home, people will feel incentivized to relocate.  A neo-
classical microeconomic approach suggests that individuals factor more than 
information about wage differentials into their decision-making process.  Likelihood of 
obtaining employment, cost of relocation, and an individual’s education and skill levels 
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come into play in the individual’s decision to relocate.   Invoking Ravenstein, Lee (1966) 
defined the notion of such “intervening obstacles” as distance and prohibitive receiving 
state institutions influence migration flows as well.   
When voluntary migration occurs, it is a result of optimal choice.  In order for 
optimal choice to emerge, three factors must be present: (1) demand for migrant labor; 
(2) awareness of demand for migrant labor; and (3) desirable opportunities. (Portes and 
Rumbaut, 2006: 17)  The act of actually relocating internationally is an incredible 
individual investment.  If the move promises a high return on investment, most 
individuals will take the plunge.  Once labor-driven movement is established, other 
factors begin to incite reciprocal migration.  Family ties, entrepreneurial opportunities, 
and a promise of ongoing economic or social support incentivize additional movement 
over time.   
Richmond (1993) sums up the difference between conflict and non-conflict 
migration most concisely, writing that voluntary migration is “proactive” while refugee 
movement is “reactive.”    As Kunz (1973) points out, the involuntary “push” driving 
refugees out of their home state creates circumstances that are different from those of 
other immigrants.  These include trauma (mental and physical), loss of contact with key 
family and social networks, and change in socioeconomic status post-resettlement.  The 
result on refugee psychology includes an incredibly complex interplay of altered history, 
compromised culture, and political exile.   
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To summarize so-called migrant “types,” I borrow Portes’ and Rumbault’s (2006: 
p. 18-33) immigration typology.  They propose that contemporary migrants fall into one 
of the following categories: 
• Labor Migrants – Labor migrants are contract laborers, seasonal workers, and 
individuals who, for the most part, are motivated to relocate by the prospect of 
obtaining a low-skill job.  
 
• Skilled Professionals – Skilled professionals are individuals with advanced 
degrees, often in medical, technical, engineering, and research fields.  Whereas 
we might view labor migrants as driven by unemployment or lack of opportunity, 
professionals are driven by new career opportunities and the promise of an 
improved work environment. 
 
• Entrepreneurial Immigrants – Entrepreneurial immigrants relocate to reunite 
with comprise “ethnic enclaves” that have already settled in their receiving 
community. Entrepreneurs access sufficient capital and labor to sustain a 
business that, in turn, supports the enclave. 
 
• Refugees and Asylees - Refugees and asylees are individuals who relocated “not 
as a matter of personal choice, but a governmental decision based on a 
combination of legal guidelines and political expediency.” (Portes and Rumbault, 
2006: 31-32)  Refugee status is conferred on migrants forced from their home 
country, while asylees are have already fled their country of origin and cannot 
return.   
 
I view labor migrants, skilled professionals and entrepreneurial immigrants as 
belonging to a broad “non-conflict” group.  Although certainly migrants represent 
distinct groups and present a unique set of defining characteristics, their migration was 
not driven by violent conflict.  Likewise, I distinguish refugees as a second research 
group since their experience was driven by conflict and therefore illustrates sharp 
differences between non-conflict and conflict-driven experiences.   
21 
 
 
 
 
Evolving Transnationalism 
Marx (1848) forecasted that industrial capitalism would “annihilate space,” and 
new interstate economic relationships would lead to “intercourse in every direction, a 
universal interdependence of nations.”  Wallerstein’s (1974) following world systems 
theory frames the scope of global capitalism more specifically.  He argued that the 
Western European feudal crisis lasting from about 1300-1450 gave way to global 
expansion of domestic economic systems.  Western European powers pushed beyond 
their borders, seeking labor supplies in less developed foreign lands.  Via colonialism, 
“core” European powers constructed steadfast economic dependencies between 
themselves and less powerful “periphery” states.  In doing so, capitalism transformed 
from a bounded domestic economic structure to an international system of complex 
multi-state interdependence based on interplays between inequality and power.  World 
systems theory thus allows us to examine states as actors on a global plane and a world 
economy rather than geographically bounded political and economic silos. 
 These early contemplations ushered the development of modern globalization 
theory.  To paraphrase Basch et al (1994:11-12) and Kearney (1995:548), we can define 
globalization as a broad set of social, economic, cultural and demographic practices that 
transcend national borders.  Sassen (1998) writes, "a good part of globalization consists 
of an enormous variety of micro-processes that begin to denationalize what had been 
constructed as national - whether policies, capital, political subjectivities, urban spaces, 
temporal frames, or any other of a variety of dynamics and domains." 
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Globalization has had sweeping effects on the international system.  For one, the 
interconnectedness of labor and product markets provides broader access to consumer 
goods and labor opportunities.  While this increases access to affordable technologies 
and innovative products, globalization critics note also that it also incites concerns about 
wage fairness, worker safety, environmental conditions, and the broadening political 
and economic influence of multi-national corporations.  Globalization scholars argue 
also that increased economic interconnectedness renders states more vulnerable to the 
effects of economic collapse in far-away locations, since they are increasingly depending 
on each other for labor, goods and services.   
In the scope of this research, I am most concerned with globalization’s impact on 
international migration.  Without a doubt, globalization increases movement.  It also 
opens the door for more access to information and various means of communication, 
meaning that we all have greater exposure to other cultures, languages, and ideas.  
Globalization encourages transnationalism.  With more people relocating, greater ease 
in communicating back and traveling to the homeland, and increased political and 
economic cooperation between states, individuals have an enhanced ability to observe 
and act in more than one location at a time.    
Faist (2000) suggests that globalization, nationalism, and transnationalism are 
three fields entwined, but different.  He sums the differences between globalization and 
transnationalism most concisely by saying that globalization involves “deterritorialized” 
processes while transnational processes are tied to two or more nation states, and 
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therefore, not “denationalized.”  (Faist, 2000: 210-11; cited also by Kivisto, 2001, 566). 
Transnationalism is thus related to globalization and migration as a resultant process, 
but it differs in that it is “anchored in and transcend[s] one or more nation states rather 
than occurring in a global space.”  (Kearney, 1995a: 548; also cited in Mahler, 1998) 
Despite globalization’s destabilization of the notion of states as free-standing 
entities, Glick Schiller et al (1992) point out that the nation-state persists as the primary 
structure by which we organize and govern.   Brubaker (1996: 14) defines a nation as 
“collective individuals capable of coherent, purposeful collective action.”  
Conceptualizing transnationalism requires developing some understanding of nationalist 
loyalty as an organizing principle, even when those loyalties transcend traditional state 
boundaries.  To be sure, even in a transnational existence, action is formed first around 
the national, whether encouraged by the state or sought out by the individual.  
Brubaker (1996: 5) writes of “transborder nationalisms” as being these “external 
national homelands” that establish obligations and responsibilities transcendent of 
geographic boundaries and legal citizenship.   Yet, globalization and transnationalism do 
challenge traditional concepts of the nation-state.  Questions of jurisdiction, over-
lapping institutions and citizenship are not easily answered. 
This becomes further complex considering that in contemporary life, an 
individual’s national associations may change repeatedly over time.  Hobsbawm (1990) 
reminds that states exist only “in the context of a particular stage of technological and 
economic development.”  Just as the state takes on multiple identities over time, it is 
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possible also to assume multiple national loyalties and affiliations, be they self-ascribed 
or imposed. 
 Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Szanton-Blanc. (Glick Schiller, Basch 
et al. 1992; Glick Schiller, Basch et al. 1992; Basch, Glick Schiller et al. 1994; Glick 
Schiller, Basch et al. 1995; Szanton-Blanc, Basch et al. 1995; Glick Schiller and Fouron 
1998)  contend that contemporary immigrants engage in different social, cultural and 
political processes than those who came before them.  In other words, today’s migrants 
are transnational; yesterday’s were not.  They argue that migrants of yesteryear became 
immersed in their receiving communities, and broke ties with the homeland, whereas 
contemporary immigrants’ “…networks, activities, and patterns of life encompass both 
their home and host societies.  Their lives cut across social boundaries and bring two 
societies into a single social field.” (Basch, Glick Schiller et al. 1994)   
 But transnationalism is not a new phenomenon.  While the degree and 
frequency of interaction with the homeland has changed with the rising tides of 
globalization, most immigrants have always maintained some sort of tie to the 
homeland via kinship networks, financial remittances or more structured means of 
economic and political participation.  Portes credits improved communications and 
transportation technology with paving the way for a viable, accessible transnational 
space wherein immigrants can interact with the homeland, and to some degree, exert 
influence within the homeland from their receiving state. (Portes and Rumbaut 1990; 
Portes 1999; Portes, Guarnizo et al. 1999)  Kivisto (2001: 555) and Morawska (1999) 
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support this contention in later work, making clear that although today’s migrants may 
exist in more defined transnational spaces, past migrants were always connected to 
loved ones left behind, and financial remittances have long played a heavy hand in 
shaping interactions between home- and hostlands.   
Vertovec (1999) summarizes no fewer than six discursive transnationalism 
themes, paraphrased here:  (1) a new “border spanning” form of social organization; (2) 
a “diasporic consciousness;” (3) a mode of cultural reproduction; (4) a mode of “cultural 
reproduction” akin to hybridity; (5) a site of dual-state and extra-state political 
engagement; and (6) a shift from concepts of space that focus on local domains to those 
that are “translocal” in their reach.  I do not find these themes to be mutually exclusive.  
Transnationalism is at once all of these things with varying intensity.  Although atypical, 
some migrants do not experience a transnational existence at all.  For some, 
transnationalism is a conscious means of staying connected to the cultural, social and 
political.  For others, transnational activity manifests from an instinctual tie to the 
familial and a yearning for connectedness.  However exercised, transnationalism crafts 
evolving notions of community. 
Transnational Communities and Diasporas 
 Faist focuses on transnationalism as a new social space between nation-states 
that is constructed by transnational processes.  Kivisto (2001: 565) summarizes this as 
follows, “…the idea of transnational space treats the migratory system as a boundary-
breaking process in which two (usually) or more nation-states are penetrated and 
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become part of a singular new social space.”   Within Faist’s “transnational space” ideas, 
cultured, and resources circulating among migrants create transcendent social, cultural, 
political and economic networks. These networks, comprised of “transmigrants,” 
become communities in and of themselves.  In completing actions between the sending 
state and the receiving state, transmigrants occupy a unique space.  They are 
simultaneously influenced by more than one system and influential in more than one 
system.      
Glick Schiller et al (1992: 1-2) strike the most oft-cited definitions for 
contemporary “transmigration” and “transmigrants.”  They write, 
We have defined transmigration as the processes by which immigrants build 
social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of 
settlement.  Immigrants who build such social fields are designated 
“transmigrants.”  Transmigrants develop and maintain multiple relations – 
familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political that span 
borders.  Transmigrants take actions, make decisions, feel concerns, and 
develop identities within social networks that connect them to two or more 
societies simultaneously.   
 
Roberts, Frank and Lozano-Ascencio (1999:239) suggest then that, “transnational 
migrant communities’ are groupings of immigrants who participate on a routine basis in 
a field of relationships, practices, and norms that include both places of origin and 
places of destination.” Portes characterizes this transnational domain as being 
somewhat symmetrical --  composed of a growing number of persons who live dual lives 
in the sense that they speak two languages, own homes in two countries, earn a living 
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through transactions spanning national borders, and in many cases, maintain dual 
citizenship. (Portes et al, 1999:217; also see in Kivisto, 2001:560). 
 This duality extends beyond the construction of interstate transnational spaces 
as we understand them.  Faist’s (2000) transnational communities are not limited to 
territoriality, but rather, reliant on tangible social and cultural bonds.   These 
“communities without propinquity” span more than one nation-state at one point in 
time.  (See also Glick Schiller et al 1992: 11, and Vertovec 1999: 450.)   Vertovec (1999) 
calls these transnational communities “social formations that transcend physical 
borders,” and he suggests there are five conceptual tenets inherent to transnationalism 
theory: consciousness, means of cultural reproduction, link to capital, point of political 
engagement and reconstruction of place (See also Al-Ali et al., 2001).   Gupta and 
Ferguson (1992: 9) note the fundamental impact created by altering this space, “…it has 
enabled the creation of forms of solidarity and identity that do not rest on an 
appropriation of space where contiguity and face-to-face contact are paramount.” 
Kivisto (2001:569) elaborates, “…transnational migrants are engaged in activities 
designed to define and enhance their position in the receiving nation, while 
simultaneously seeking to remain embedded in a participatory way in the everyday 
affairs of the homeland community…” Guarnizo and Smith (1998, 21) also view 
transnational identity formation within a context of “embedding and disembedding.”  As 
they put it, “Identity is contextual, but not radically discontinuous.  People seek to be 
situated, to have a stable mooring, an anchor amidst the tempest…”    
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 This desire for mooring may play a role in diaspora formation. As Clifford 
describes, “loss and hope [are] a defining tension” of all diasporas.  Vertovec calls upon 
earlier work from Sheffer (1986) and Safran (1991) to summarize the “triadic 
relationship” contained within diaspora as “…globally dispersed yet collectively self-
identified ethnic groups; the territorial states and contexts where such groups reside; 
the homeland states and contexts whence they and their forebears came.”   Safran 
(ibid) highlights defining features of a diaspora, including the occupation of at least two 
communities outside the homeland, share a common memory of their shared 
experience and a feeling of expulsion, or at least, a belief that they “cannot be fully 
accepted by their host country.”   Diasporas often envision eventual repatriation, and as 
such, they become quite involved in homeland projects and continued development of 
the communities they left behind.  Safran concludes that this ongoing involvement with 
the homeland plays an important role in establishing political identity.   
While once a free-standing concept, “diaspora” is increasingly difficult to 
distinguish from “transnational community.”  Vertovec (1998, xvi) explains, “’Diaspora’ 
is the term often used today to describe almost any population which is considered 
“deterritorialized” or “transnational”  that is, which has originated in a land other than 
where it currently resides and whose social, economic, and political networks cross the 
borders of nation-states, or indeed, span the globe.” 
Both transnational communities and diasporas are affected politically by their 
status as migrants living apart from the homeland.  Vertovec (1998, xviii) writes that 
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their “political interests are often ignited by the “political plight” of the homeland.”  
However, it is unclear how and to what degree transnational communities and 
diasporas are affected.  In his study of Croats residing in Sweden, Frykman (2001: 169) 
writes, “…it is yet to be seen whether it [exile] provides a new “enemy” against which 
diaspora groups might solidarize, or whether they will make diaspora Croats lose 
interest in current Croatian politics since they feel they cannot affect it anymore.”  I 
conceptualize transnational politics and identity formation further in the following 
section.   
Transnational Politics 
The immigration experience has always been wrought with conflict between “old 
loyalties and new realities.” (Portes and Rumbault, 2006:120)  Portes and Rumbault 
recount how 18th Century Germans tried to “re-create” their nation state via tight-knit 
ethnic enclaves situated within the United States.  Slovaks, Croats and Polish soon 
followed suit.  It was not long before political stakeholders realized that they could levy 
support from these communities by drawing on their shared status as immigrants to 
rally them around “common” political issues.  Portes and Rumbault (125-126) write, 
“…ethnic markers, originally used to fragment the working class, were redefined by 
reactive formation into symbols of pride and rallying points for mass political 
participation.” 
Large corporations and political movements commonly exploited immigrants for 
political gain. However, as they slowly gained footholds in their new communities, 
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immigrants leveraged the solidarity of their enclaves.  Although frequently manipulated 
by politicians and corporate interests, enclave leadership quickly learned the power of 
the “ethnic vote” could further their position in the hostland when tendered in 
exchange for job opportunities and improved housing conditions.  Immigrants also 
leveraged their solidarity to further homeland agendas.  Migrant communities regularly 
lobbied local, state and federal officials to enact policies directly concerning treatment 
of their homeland.  As Portes and Rumbault (1999: 221) observe, “The stronger these 
communities became, the stronger their influence on home country politics.”   
Transnational political space appears to be increasingly complex.  In short, we 
know that migrants’ affiliations continue to develop after they cross national borders, 
and we speculate that they develop influential political affiliations in more than one 
community.  Baubock (2003: 705) writes, “…political institutions and practices that 
transcend the borders of independent states are transnational if they involve 
simultaneous overlapping affiliations of persons to geographically separate polities.”  
Political action becomes transnational when it transcends national borders in either 
action or effect.  As Portes and Rumbaut write, (2006: 131) “In many cases, the 
magnitude, duration, and impact of migration are so strong that migrant social networks 
mature into transnational social fields spanning the sending and receiving 
country...[T]hose who live within transnational social fields are exposed to a set of social 
expectations, cultural values, and patterns of interaction that are shaped by more than 
one political system.” 
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 As such, transnational political action is multi-level. (Smith, M.P. 1994, cited in 
Guarnizo and Smith, 1998).  It occurs in local and distant milieus. Actions may be the 
collective efforts of international organizations and multinational corporations or they 
may be “survival strategies” of transnational migrants.  Moreover, transnational space, 
although seemingly supra-national, is better described as local-to-local than as a space 
beyond structure.  Put simply,  
Transnational practices, while connecting collectivities located in more than 
one national territory, are embodies in specific social relations established 
between specific people, situated in unequivocal localities at historically 
determined times...While transnational practices extend beyond two or 
more national territories, they are built within the confines of specific social, 
economic and political relations which are bound together with perceived 
shared interests and meanings.  (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998:11-13) 
 
Goldring elaborates further, “…transnational social fields, and localities of origin 
in particular, provide a special context in which people can improve their social position, 
and perhaps their power, make claims about their changing status and have it 
appropriately valorized, and also participate in changing their place of origin so that it 
becomes more consistent with their changing expectations and statuses…” (Goldring, 
1998: 167) this has been shown to lend leverage to leaders who are able to succeed in a 
transnational space more so than the community of origin.  In Goldring’s argument, this 
is especially salient for Mexican immigrants who strive to build a common Mexican 
political identity from the foreground of the United States, absent the constraints of 
Mexican authority.   
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Transnational political structures legitimize themselves by basing connections on 
shared meanings, efforts to achieve social and political equality, and various processes 
that may be considered the “political democratization” of transnational space.  
(Guranizo and Smith, 1998)  As is the dual nature of transnationalism, transmigrants’ 
political identity becomes at once “free formed and socially determined.”  (Guarnizo 
and Smith, 1998, 20)   Shapiro (1990) observes that in this “post-modern polity” 
migrants redefine their identity with every movement, and every introduction to new 
structures and spaces.   
These factors shape the political identity of the transnational communities and 
diasporas. (See Rouse: 1991, Safran: 1991, Clifford: 1994, etc.)  Clifford (1994: 304) 
explains this difference, “Diasporas usually pre-suppose longer distances and a 
separation more like exile: a constitutive taboo on return, or its postponement to a 
remote future.  Diasporas also connect multiple communities of a dispersed 
population.”  This affects the mode and intensity of the diaspora’s political engagement. 
Appadurai (1995) writes, “They also involve various rather puzzling new forms of linkage 
between diasporic nationalism, delocalized political communications and revitalized 
political commitments at both ends of the diasporic process.”  Clifford summaries this 
as, “Diaspora cultures thus mediate, in a lived tension, the experiences of separation 
and entanglement, of living here and remembering/desiring another place.” 
Thus, the strings tying transnational communities and diasporas to two 
communities are drawn taut, and we know that this has some impact on their sphere of 
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action and influence.  How does this affect their political engagement, specifically?  
What other factors influence political identity formation and resultant action?  I review 
these influences in the forthcoming section. 
The Role of the State 
The sending and receiving states are paramount in determining the degree to 
which migrants maintain transnational ties and forge transnational communities.  Faist 
(2000) writes, “Transnationalism calls attention to the cultural and political projects of 
nation-states as they vie for hegemony in relations with other nation-states, with their 
citizens and ‘aliens.’”  It is challenging, and in some instances undesirable, for migrants 
to break from the state with which they associate their language, culture and personal 
history.  This is even more so the case when transnational activity is sanctioned by the 
state directly.   Drainville (1995, repeated in Drainville 1998) observes, 
It appears…that political transformation in the world economy…relies both 
on the confinement of political and social relationships to the space of 
national social formations, and on the capacity of states to structure political 
participation…[International organizations and states have] in effect built a 
wall around the space [they] are attempting to manage 
 
Homeland/hostland policies determine migrants’ array of options to some degree, 
and thus, migrants’ ability to become “incorporated” as full citizens in either locale. 
(Guarnizo and Smith, 1998, Smith, R., 1998, Ong, 1999).  These structural influences 
hold broad implications for migrants’ perception of their place both within and between 
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state structures.  Baubock and Rundell (1998:21) summarize it simply, “From the 
migrants’ perspective, states come in and out of their lives.” 
According to Baubock (2005), there are several reasons states allow expatriate 
political participation including, maintaining influence via old political ties, the need for 
financial remittances and foreign investorship (see also in Baubock, 2003 and Itzigsohn, 
2000), ethnic nationalism, and at times, some specific motivation by a political party or 
interest sector.   Guarnizo and Smith suggest some sending states maintain tangible ties 
via “transnational grassroots movements” that foster transnational projects (as initially 
brought to light by Smith, M.P., 1994) and often launch efforts to reincorporate 
departed citizens.  
Transnational practice is thus not only a result of structural processes and 
mobility, but sometimes a result of strategic nation-building.  Glick Schiller and Fouron 
(1998: 132) write, “Nation-building is therefore identified as a set of historical and 
affective processes that link disparate and/or heterogeneous populations together and 
forge their loyalty to and identity with a central government apparatus and institutional 
structure.”  This is most evident when migration occurs after conflict or state collapse, 
as is the case with Bosnian and Kosovar diasporas.  Baubock (2003: 712) describes this 
influence on migrant political mobilization, particularly diasporas: 
Nation-building processes in the homeland also go a long way towards 
accounting for variations in transnational political activities between 
migrant groups of different origins that otherwise show similar pattern of 
immigration and settlement. While transnational political practices in most 
cases will be limited to the first generation of immigrants, diasporic 
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identities can persist over generations among descendants of nations 
fighting for independence and international recognition. They can 
sometimes even be reactivated among groups that originally emigrated as 
labor migrants. 
 
 States drive nation-building most notably by institutionalizing financial 
remittances from departed citizens. According to the 2002 United Nations International 
Migration Report, some states rely on migrant remittances sent back to the home 
country as a major source of foreign exchange earnings and an important addition to 
gross domestic product.  The World Bank estimates that remittances to developing 
countries topped $251 billion dollars in 2007.   I abbreviate the World Bank’s remittance 
flow data table in Table One.  
Table 1 - Remittance Flows to Developing Countries, 2002-2007 ($ billions)                                                                              
INFLOWS                                      2003     2004    2005     2006     2007 
 
Developing countries                 143       163     194       226      251 
East Asia and Pacific               35         39      47       53        59 
Europe and Central Asia          16         23      32       39        47 
Latin America and Caribbean              35         42      48       57        61 
Middle-East and North Africa             20         23      24       27        29 
South Asia                                30         29      33       40        44 
Sub-Saharan Africa                     6         8       10       11        12 
 
World                                   206       234     266       303      337 
 
Source: Ratha, D., S. Mohapatra, et al. (2008). Remittance flows to developing countries, 2002-2007 ($ 
billion). Revision to Remittance Trends, The World Bank. 
 
 
States also encourage political action by adopting citizenship policies that are 
amicable to transnational practice.  Sending and receiving states overtly encourage 
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transnational political practice when they allow migrants to maintain homeland 
citizenship regardless of their citizenship status in their receiving communities.  In this 
way, the state actually becomes involved in the transnational space (Glick Schiller et al 
1994).  Some (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998) suggest that enacting dual citizenship policies 
inhibits migrants’ full assimilation into their receiving community – a policy byproduct 
that maybe unintentional or strategic, depending on the motivations of the sending 
state. As Portes and Rumbaut (2006: 18) put it, “….the web of transactions between 
sending areas and their expatriate communities take over as engines of the movement.”  
Some scholars focus on this political duality as a barrier to “properly” enacting 
citizenship, one that “may result in new geographies in the dynamics and distribution of 
rights and identities, and patterns of exclusion and inclusion,” (Castles 1999; Soysal 
2000).  Portes and Rumbault (2006: 120) regard U.S. immigrants specifically as being 
political.   They write, “Depending on the variable geometry of places of origin and 
destination, immigrant communities may be passionately committed to political causes 
back home, either in support of or opposition to the existing regime.  They may see 
themselves as representatives of their nation-state abroad, or they may turn away from 
all things past and concentrate on building a new life in America.” 
From the vantage point of the receiving state, immigrants’ entry into the political 
milieu is typically delayed, if it ever occurs.  Many immigrants are so preoccupied with 
finding work, housing and language assistance that establishing one’s self as a political 
actor is simply unfeasible.  Early incorporation typically occurs when some exceptional 
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circumstance is present.  In situations where immigrants arrive in their receiving state 
with a high degree or education, or are barred from ever returning to their homeland, 
we observe a higher degree of political awareness and agility.  (Portes and Rumbault, 
2006)  The receiving state’s policies “…can accelerate social integration and economic 
mobility, or it can perpetuate social dependence and economic marginalization.”  
(Portes and Rumbault, 2006: 93) Portes and Rumbault identify three potential state 
dispositions in this regard:  “exclusion, passive acceptance, or active encouragement.” 
Migrants affected by structural economic changes typically leverage their job 
training, business formation and entry into labor markets as the foundation for social 
citizenship.  Although lacking distinct political entry points, they may integrate “via 
secondary political rights” allotted them by trade unions, economic development 
programs, and so on (Miller 1987).  Post-conflict migrants, however, likely experience 
this transnational duality differently than voluntary migrants. Frequently conflict 
destroyed, or at the very least distorted, old in- and out-group political ties (Wahlbeck, 
1999. See also Kelly, 2003.)   
Liebich (2007) lays out these complexities within the scope of the Baltic states 
whose “statelessness lasted longer than statehood.” Discontinuous statehood and near 
constant political upheaval has broad implications for political identity and membership, 
particularly when the citizenship experiences “anguish at the perspective of the 
disappearance of one’s own people and country.” (Bibo 1991 [1946]: 13-69), also see 
Liebich) Throughout the Eastern European and Balkan states the concept of citizenship 
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and political boundary is so ambiguous that migrants opportunity structures are 
constantly changing. Some Baltic states allow citizens to maintain citizenship by birth 
forever, but some withdraw legal citizenship once the resident departs.  Hungary and 
Slovakia, for example, allow “plural citizenship” out of concern for their diasporas. 
Liebich (2007: 20) summarizes the state of citizenship policy in Eastern European 
countries,  
…[E]migré pressure in favour of plural citizenship is becoming stronger than 
ever.  First, as a consequence of the fall of communism, these countries 
have reconciled themselves with their historical émigré communities, just as 
these communities abroad have reconciled themselves with their countries 
of origin.  Second, these countries are producing a significant new wave of 
emigration. 
 
Guarnizo suggests that immigrants who have obtained U.S. citizenship are less 
likely to remain involved in the politics of the homeland.  He argues, “Becoming a U.S. 
citizen should act as a ‘natural barrier’ to the continuation of political transnationalism.” 
(Guarnizo et al, 2003: 1216).   Guranizo also points to studies suggesting a correlation 
between a higher degree of educational attainment and a greater propensity for 
migrant’s political engagement in the receiving community.  Pickus (1998), for example, 
expounds upon the more global literature depicting education as an influence on 
political participation (Lipset 1960; Almond and Verba 1963; Olsen 1980; Tarrow 1998), 
suggesting that educated immigrants are actually likely to shift their energy (and in 
some cases, more material resources) to the political domain of their new home.  Within 
this reallocation, migrants affect change through local development projects, social 
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associations and active political involvement, which may include financial investment in 
a cause or initiative (Guarnizo et al, 2003).   
 
Summary of Theoretical Underpinnings 
 Clearly, there is significant literature evaluating immigration and 
transnationalism.  In general, this literature finds that migrants, regardless of the 
circumstances preceding their movement and in at least partial contrast to the past, 
have come increasingly to participate in a variety of dual social, political, and economic 
processes.  Less is known about how migrants’ distinct experiences affect their views 
about homeland and hostland politics, and their propensity to participate on or both 
political arenas.  Moreover, we understand very little regarding how differences in 
sending conditions hold political significance for the individual, the community, and the 
state.  
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CHAPTER THREE – THEORETICAL APPROACH AND 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 Every migration experience is different, dependent in part on what triggered the 
migration flow.  People relocate for myriad reasons:  war, natural disasters, government 
repression, economic change, and the search for new work and educational 
opportunities.  The circumstances of departure frequently determine the level of 
physical and social capital available to migrants.  There may be an existing housing or 
employment opportunity, or aid may be available from pre-established family members.  
Non-governmental organizations may (NGOs) offer support to immigrants and refugees, 
or assist in obtaining citizenship and institutional support.  On the other hand, there 
may be little by way of assistance with resettlement, language and job training.   
We know that migrants can have impetus to exert political influence over 
structures in their sending and receiving states simultaneously.  But little is known about 
migrants’ transnational political action from a comparative perspective.  There is 
insufficient insight regarding whether or not immigrants’ conditions of departure 
correspond to their political participation habits post-relocation. We know even less 
about how different transnational communities and diasporas compare to others with 
respect to membership and political participation.   
  
41 
 
 
 
 
Research Hypotheses 
This study analyzes the political actions of three specific migrant groups.  It 
differs from other approaches in that I seek specifically to measure (1) difference in the 
type and frequency of political participation in the home versus receiving community; 
and (2) differences in participation between migrants driven by conflict, and migrants 
who relocated due to non-conflict events and circumstances.  I propose two 
comparative hypotheses:   
 
H₁ = Conflict-driven migrants engage in political activity more so in their 
sending state than in their receiving state.  
 
Null:   Conflict driven migrants exhibit no difference in political participation 
between their sending and receiving community, or they exhibit less activity in 
the sending community than the receiving community. 
 
H₂ = Conflict-driven migrants engage in sending state political activity more so 
than non-conflict migrants. 
 
Null: There is no difference in sending state political participation between 
conflict and non-conflict migrants. 
 
Toward these aims, I propose the following research questions: 
• Is there a transnational dimension to political participation for conflict and 
non-conflict migrants? 
 
• Is conflict migrants’ political participation actively skewed more toward the 
sending state or the receiving state? 
 
• How is political participation different for conflict-driven migrants versus 
migrants driven by other factors?  
 
• What are the implications of these differences for the political participation 
structures in sending and receiving states? 
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In the sections that follow, I outline my research approach and methodology, 
including a definition of variables. 
Defining a Mixed Methods Approach 
In gauging whether conflict migrants take stage as transnational political actors, I 
rely heavily on the structural foundations in Michel Laguerre’s Diaspora, Politics, and 
Globalization.  Theoretically, Laguerre relies on globalization as his primary backdrop.  I 
place this study more precisely within the scope of transnationalism research to better 
explain potential dual-state political activity.  I have chosen this theoretical niche 
because recent research widely concludes that interstate migration is not merely a 
byproduct of globalization. Refugees develop transnational bonds notwithstanding 
globalization. (Al-Ali et al, 2001; Moberg, 1996; Shami, 1996)   
I diverge from Laguerre methodologically as well.  Laguerre examines the Haitian 
diaspora migration flow without making any in- or out-group comparisons across a set 
of control variables.  Conversely, I examine three distinct migration flows from the same 
geographic region across a fixed time period.  I define a range of dependent and control 
variables that allowed me to assess differences within and between the conflict and 
non-conflict groups.  That said, I employed a mixed qualitative/quantitative research 
design, because it allowed for greatest flexibility in data-gathering and analysis within 
such a diverse and complex population. 
43 
 
 
 
 
At its simplest, mixed methodology is defined as, “Data collection that includes 
closed-ended items with numerical responses as well as open-ended items on the same 
survey.”  (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998)  This allows the researcher to integrate 
“qualitative and quantitative data in a way that is mutually reinforcing.”  (Creswell and 
Plano Clark, 2007)  I used a parallel/simultaneous mixed methods design, meaning that I 
collected qualitative and quantitative data at the same time, (i.e. using the same 
interview protocol), and I presented qualitative and quantitative results in an integrated 
fashion.  My wish to rely primarily on “hard” or quantitative results primarily is 
tempered by the fact that my sample size was not sufficient to draw full statistical 
comparisons in all categories; thus, I use qualitative results to inform the quantitative 
analysis and illustrate specific cases.  Ulin et al (2004) illustrate this model visually, 
which I reproduce in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1: Mixed Methods Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 QUALITATIVE 
RESULTS QUANTITATIVE 
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Population and Sampling 
 The unit of analysis for this study is the individual participant.  I limited criteria 
for inclusion to adults over 18 years old who relocated to the United States from 
Albania, Bosnia or Kosovo between 1990 and 2009.  I focused on this region because all 
three groups departed the same region of the world at approximately the same point in 
time.  Additionally, including these groups allowed me to draw a basis for comparison 
considering that the Bosnians and Kosovars were forced migrants and the Albanians 
relocated voluntarily.    I excluded illegal immigrants from selection, because: (1) I was 
concerned about confidentiality issues that may arise by my documenting interviews; 
and (2) illegal immigrants do not have full access to political structures, and therefore, it 
would be inappropriate to include them in a survey accounting for political 
participation.   
Although most desirable, I could not use random sampling for this study.  I did 
not have access to a large enough research population to employ randomized selection 
techniques that would be truly representative of the population residing in the research 
area.  This is a common problem when studying such specific populations.  As 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998:73) suggest. “When you can’t reach the whole 
population…. It’s probably more advisable to select your units non-randomly, based on 
information you already have about these units.”   As such, I used snowball sampling, 
meaning that I drafted an initial list of contacts, and requested an interview from those 
within study parameters.  I interviewed those who consented, and then following the 
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interview, I asked them for additional contacts.  This approach yielded 86 potential 
participants, of whom 77 fell within my selection criteria.  In sum, 36 participants 
consented to participate in the study.  Since all interviews undertaken were 100 percent 
complete across all participants, I am able to report a survey response rate of 46.7 
percent.3 
Definition of Variables and Measures  
Transnationalism is exceedingly complex.  So many micro- and macro-
determinants exist that it is very difficult to illuminate all potential influences on 
participants’ behavior.  I started by defining an independent variable:  
x = Conflict Group Assignment 
I assigned participants to conflict/non-conflict groups based on two conditions: 
(1) known presence of conflict in the sending state at the time of the participants’ 
departure; and (2) the participants’ indication that conflict was the primary reason they 
departed the home state. If the respondents expressly indicated that they left due to 
conflict, then I assigned them to the conflict group.4  Over 66 percent of participants 
experienced the presence of conflict in their country of origin, while 33.3 percent did 
not.    Based on their responses, all members assigned to the conflict group were 
                                                           
3
 This rate was calculated according to American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) 
standards for in-person household interviews.  http://www.aapor.org/Response_Rates_An_Overview.htm  
4
 This information was gathered using questions 22 and 23 from the interview questionnaire, which I 
include in Appendix c.   
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Bosnian and Kosovar, while all non-conflict group members were Albanians from 
Albania.   
Open-ended responses emphasized departure conditions.   For example, a 50-
year old Bosnian woman said, “…we left our country because of war…But because of 
war, we also had no job, no education, no life.  Put in perspective…with two little 
children, I really didn’t have much of a choice.  We ended up here.  That means we 
didn’t have a choice.  We couldn’t stay [in Bosnia].”  A 62-year old Bosnian man 
explained also, “As a result of politics before war and the result of war…My decision for 
me is that it is better for me to stay away [from Bosnia].  And that is why I came over 
here...”   
Kosovar participants voiced similar experiences.  A 46-year old Kosovar woman 
responded, “[I left] because of war.  I never thought I’m going to leave my country, 
never in my life.  I was the one from all my friends who I said I’m never going to leave 
[Kosovo].”    Another Kosovar woman, age 24, elaborated further, “It was the war, and 
then we found out that our entire property had been destroyed.  So we came here – it 
was the fastest way to get financially stable and see what we could do, whether to 
return or stay here.”  
In order to define variables, I first laid out what, in my estimation, were all of the 
possibilities for participants’ political participation: 
• Action takes place within receiving state political structures only 
 
• Action takes place within sending state political structures only 
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• Action occurs within receiving state political framework, but it is centered on 
issues relevant to the diaspora or with regard to receiving state policy toward 
the sending state. 
 
• Action involves any combination of the above 
 
• Participant does not act within in any political structure.  
 
Using these assumptions, I turned then to define a set of dependent variables.  
These are summarized in Table X.   
Table 2 - Definition of Dependent Variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
Name Definition Points Possible 
y US Citizen Current U.S. Citizen None 
y₁ Sending State Citizen Valid citizenship in sending state None 
y₂ Political Issue of Import There is at least one political issue 
of importance to the participant. 
None 
y₃ Political Activity Pre-
/Post-Migration 
Participants indicate if they were 
more politically active before or 
after migration. 
None 
y₄ Political Activity in US 
and Country of Origin 
Participants indicate whether they 
are more politically active in the 
sending or receiving state. 
0-1 per locale 
y₅ Political Issues Most 
Important 
Participants indicate whether 
sending or receiving state political 
issues are most important to 
them. 
0-1 per locale 
y₆ U.S. Political Party Any U.S. political party affiliation, 
not limited to any specific set of 
parties 
0-1 
y₇ Country of Origin 
Political Party 
Any sending state political party 
affiliation, not limited to any 
specific set of parties 
0-1 
y₈ Contributes Money to 
U.S. Political Entity 
Frequency of monetary political 
contributions to U.S. political 
parties and/or candidates 
0-4 
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y₉ Contributes Money to 
Country of Origin 
Political Entity 
Frequency of monetary political 
contributions to sending state 
political parties and/or candidates 
0-4 
y₁₀ Voted in U.S. Election Voted in one or more U.S. 
elections  
0-1 
y₁₁ Voted in Country of 
Origin Election 
Voted in one or more sending 
state elections since migration to 
the United States 
0-1 
y₁₂ Influence Political 
Opinions in United 
States (scored from a 
list of possible methods) 
Number of methods used to 
influence political opinions of 
others living in the United States 
0-6 
y₁₃ Influence Political 
Opinions in Country of 
Origin (scored from a 
list of possible methods) 
Number of methods used to 
influence political opinions of 
others living in the sending state 
0-6 
y₁₄ Gather Information 
about U.S. Politics 
(scored from a list of 
information types) 
Number of sources consulted for 
information about U.S. politics 
0-4 
y₁₅ Gather Information 
about Country of Origin 
Politics (scored from a 
list of information 
types) 
Number of sources consulted for 
information about sending state 
politics 
0-4 
y₁₆ U.S. Political 
Participation Score  
Cumulative numeric score on all 
dependent variables pertaining to 
U.S. participation  
0-20 
y₁₇ Sending State  Political 
Participation Score 
Cumulative numeric score on all 
dependent variables pertaining to 
country of origin participation 
0-20 
 
I identified as many valid control variables as possible.  These included 
• Gender 
• Sending State 
• Ethnicity  
• Length of Time US Citizen (in years) 
• U.S. Immigration Status at Arrival 
• Remittances to Family/Friends (in frequency per year) 
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• Remittances to Projects (in frequency per year) 
• Considers Repatriation 
• Parents/Siblings/Friends/Children Residing in Receiving State 
• Parents/Siblings/Friends/Children Residing in Sending State 
• Religion 
• Highest Level of Education Obtained 
• English Ability at Migration 
• Current Employment Status 
• Current Salary 
• Age at Interview 
• Age at Migration 
• Marital Status 
 
I started out with a slightly longer list of control variables, but in analyzing the data, I 
omitted several due to various problems.   Specifically, I did not feel comfortable using 
the data I gathered for “Length of Time to Obtain Citizenship.”  Many of the participants 
could not remember with accuracy how long the process took, especially in light of the 
five-year Permanent Resident requirement.  Some participants factored that period into 
their estimate, and some did not.  So, I disregarded the variable. 
I also observed inconsistency in measuring voting behaviors.  I had originally set 
up the questions to gather the number of local, state and federal elections for which 
each participant had cast a vote.  But a significant number of participants could not 
recall with certainty.   Instead, I measured whether or not the person had ever voted in 
an election in the sending and receiving states since the time of migration. 
Although I was able to gather participants’ current “Employment Status” and 
“Annual Income,” I decided not to use the data I gathered for their employment status 
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and income prior to leaving their home country.   For one, the conflict participants had 
experienced so much displacement that few of them were employed at the time of 
departure, although most of them had been employed all of their lives.  Since I had 
asked for income within an ordinal scale, every participant reported an annual income 
under $25,000 USD.  I asked participants for more specific estimates of income, but they 
were essentially trying to calculate an income based on historical exchange rates to 
USD, and it seemed very unreliable.  Additionally, since there was so much economic 
strain in Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo during the mid-1990s, it was almost impossible to 
understand what income would mean as far as socioeconomic status or purchasing 
power.     
Other variables proved to be insufficient controls, because nearly the entire 
survey population exhibited the characteristics being measured.  These included 
whether the participant’s hometown was urban or rural, whether the participant had 
lived in US since migration, and property ownership in the sending state.   
Instrumentation 
 Using my variable set as a guide, I designed an original interview protocol to 
survey the population demographically and construct questions to measure political 
participation in the sending and receiving states.  The protocol contained 57 closed- and 
open-ended queries, some of which had additional follow ups and probes. The 
interviews ranged in length from 17 minutes to 112 minutes.   The interview protocol is 
available in its entirety in Appendix A.   
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Procedure and Timeframe 
The Wayne State University (WSU) Human Investigation Committee (HIC) 
Internal Review Board (IRB) approved all of my recruitment materials for distribution.   
In working with various community organizations to gather my initial participant contact 
list, I found that many Albanians, Bosnians and Kosovars in Metropolitan Detroit speak 
English fluently.  However, I hired translators to prepare cross-language materials in 
Bosnian and Albanian to ensure I did not exclude any consenting participant due to a 
language barrier.  An initial translator made all of the translations from my English 
materials into Albanian and Bosnian.   To check validity, I asked a second translator (who 
had never seen the English materials) to translate the Albanian and Bosnian materials 
back into English.  I reviewed these results to ensure the integrity of the questions and 
their meaning. 
To recruit participants, I first established a base of initial contacts drawn from 
university affiliations, student organizations, cultural groups, faith-based organizations 
and businesses with distinct affiliations with Albanians, Bosnians and Kosovars.  I mailed 
(or emailed) each person a cover letter and two recruitment flyers – one written in 
English, and one written in participant’s native language.  I also left recruitment flyers 
and local businesses and libraries, and I distributed some at community meetings where 
I felt I might make contact with eligible participants. I include recruitment materials in 
Appendix B.   After the letters and flyers were distributed, I followed up with direct 
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phone calls and email.  I allotted a total of five attempts per eligible contact before 
excluding them from my survey population. 
Overall, 46.7 percent of the eligible survey pool consented to interview.  Once a 
participant consented, I scheduled a time and location of their choosing.  I stressed that 
they should choose a location where they felt comfortable talking that afforded them a 
level of privacy.  As a result, I interviewed participants everywhere from libraries and 
coffee shops to people’s offices and backyards.  I did not present the research 
hypotheses to participants prior to interview, because I did not want to bias their 
responses.  I described the study more generally by saying, “I am conducting a study to 
better understand how individuals born outside of the United States view and 
participate in politics here and abroad.  I am gathering research information by 
interviewing individuals who relocated to Metropolitan Detroit from other countries.” 
Before beginning the interview, I presented each participant with an WSU IRB-
approved Information Sheet.  The IRB stipulated that I use an Information Sheet rather 
than a signed Informed Consent form, because they were concerned about my having 
identifying information on file for participants who may be illegal immigrants.  Please 
see the Information Sheet in Appendix C.  To protect participants’ confidentiality 
further, I coded every interview protocol with a numeric identifier only, and I did not 
keep a listing associating participants’ names with their identification number.   
I provided Information Sheets to the participants in English and their native 
language, and I reviewed the entire form with them before beginning the interview.  I 
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offered participants the option of reading from the printed interview protocol as I 
interviewed them.  I felt that this was an additional safeguard to over-coming any 
potential communication barriers, and it also seems to make the participants feel more 
at ease in answering question with numerous response options.  Two participants 
requested that a translator be present at the time of interview, and so I arranged for the 
translator to assist.  All of the other participants preferred to be interviewed in English. 
I recorded each interview using a digital audio recorder, and I transcribed the 
audio recordings into written transcripts coded with the participants’ assigned 
identification number.  I reviewed each transcript for accuracy.  I then entered coded 
closed-ended quantitative responses into an SPSS 18.0 dataset.  I cleaned the data and 
reviewed it for accuracy.  As a final quality measure, an assistant read all of the closed-
ended responses and confirmed their accurate entry into the dataset.  I reviewed each 
transcript a second time to highlight qualitative results selected for inclusion in the 
analysis.   I selected qualitative responses for inclusion based on their clarity, 
completeness and relevance.   Overall, the response had to be audibly understandable.  
The participant had to provide a complete answer to the question at hand.  Finally, 
responses had to be relevant, regardless of whether or not they lent support to the 
hypotheses.  I excluded all small talk and peripheral conversation from the transcripts.   
Data Analysis Plan 
I examined each hypothesis in its own context.  Hypothesis 1 called for within-
group comparisons, and Hypothesis 2 called for between-groups comparisons.  To start, 
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I compiled frequency distributions for all variables.  For Hypothesis 1 tests, I limited 
cases to only those participants in the conflict group.  I then cross-tabulated the data to 
determine which factors in addition to conflict/non-conflict group status potentially 
influenced my dependent variables.  Where associations were evident, I conducted 
appropriate correlation tests and interpreted results. Since I was dealing with almost 
entirely nominal-level variables, I used Pearson’s Chi Square and proportional reduction 
in error (PRE) measures such as Lambda and Cramer’s V.  Where tables were 2x2, I 
reported the Chi Square statistic, and where they were greater, I reported the Lambda 
and Cramer’s V. 
I tabulated political participation scores for every participant.  I assigned each 
survey response measuring a dependent variable a total number of possible points with 
higher points indicating a higher magnitude of participation in that particular political 
activity.  I totaled all points to create each participant’s specific political participation 
score.  The highest possible cumulative score was 20 points for sending state activity 
and 20 points for receiving state activity.  For Hypothesis 1, I compared the two scores 
to determine whether each conflict participant engaged in more in sending or receiving 
state activity, and I measured associations between control variables and mean 
participation scores.  For Hypothesis 2, I compared scores between the conflict and non-
conflict group and then engaged in further analysis.    
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Validity 
Did I measure what I intended to measure?  Are my measures appropriate 
indicators of the concepts I put forth?  Tashakkoir and Teddlie (1998:67) define internal 
validity simply as, “…the degree to which we can trust the conclusions/inferences of the 
researcher regarding the “causal” relationship between variable/events.”  I worked to 
assure internal validity in several ways.   For the quantitative analysis, I included a range 
of controls for extraneous variables, and I used appropriate statistical measures to 
isolate and explain their effects on the dependent variables.  I also designed the study to 
require both within- and between- groups comparisons so that I could better illuminate 
behavioral patterns. 
Throughout the qualitative analysis, I applied consistent meaning to questions 
and terms both during of the interviews and in my explanation of results.  I worked to 
ensure that my interpretation was true to the participants’ intended responses.  I 
accomplished this mainly by keeping my audio recordings and transcripts closely tied to 
the interview questionnaire to ensure all responses were kept within context.  I also 
examined each participant’s open-ended responses in conjunction with their closed-
ended responses to ensure that results were consistent and note any behavior that 
seemed out of step with those reported by the participant throughout the broader 
interview.  As Tashakkori and Teddlie (198, 88) put it, I was “comparing individuals to 
themselves.”    
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 Because I had to forego random sampling for a snowball sampling approach, the 
biggest threat to internal validity is selection bias.  As with any participation study, 
results may be jeopardized by those pre-dispositioned to participate in a study to begin 
with.  Although selection bias may exist, nevertheless, the narrow selection criteria 
yielded a distinct and important subset of people.  Although I tried to control for as 
many variables as possible, there are possible extraneous effects from other factors.  
Neighborhood effects, pre-existing interest in politics, connections to specific political 
issues, etc. 
Methodological Challenges 
 Mahler (1998: 91) writes, “…transnationalism should not be expected to produce 
even, linear or neat patterns.  Indeed, it is in the ambiguous and seemingly 
contradictory findings that scholars are most likely to broaden their understanding of 
transnationalism.”  Consider the challenges presented in appropriately observing 
modern immigration phenomena.  For one, individuals experience a great many things 
leading up to and during migration, which breed varying levels of personal and social 
capital.  Some immigrants arrive with nothing.  Others arrive with substantial financial 
and social means.  As Guarnizo and Smith (1998) point out, there are disparate rates of 
access (social, political, economic and otherwise) since migratory groups are themselves 
heterogeneous.  Migratory populations display varied educational, professional, and 
linguistic capabilities.  As such, it would be imprudent to suggest that all migrants have 
the same access to incorporation in sending and receiving states’ structures.     
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 Throughout the analyses, the greatest problems were attributable to three main 
factors:  (1) small sample size, and (2) extensive use of nominal-level variables, and (3) 
lack of significant variation between many responses.  These factors significantly 
challenged my ability to report statistics with a degree of confidence.  Specifically, Chi 
Square assumes that there are at least five cells present per frequency.  Few of my 
frequency distributions fulfilled this assumption, and so I caveat those tests with the 
note that they are significantly less powerful than they would be with a much larger 
dataset.   
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CHAPTER FOUR – RESEARCH POPULATION 
 
As acknowledged, transnational political participation is not new.   However, we 
do not know enough about the distinct transnational political habits of different groups 
and what factors shape them.  To date, research has lent most attention to studying 
non-conflict migrants’ as actors in home- and hostland political structures.  We know 
something of “forced” migration and its effects, but existing data and studies are not 
abundant.  In particular, the literature amply conceptualizes “diaspora,” and we have 
some understanding of how diasporas form coalitions and exert influence on the politics 
of their sending and receiving communities.  But how does this compare to the habits of 
non-diasporic groups -- groups for whom conflict was not a factor in migration?  Does 
having been forced to leave the homeland shape a person’s experience more or less so 
than voluntary departure?  It remains unclear also what matters most in determining 
where migrants will associate their political identity and subsequent loyalties, more 
generally.   
In Chapter 4, I first describe the total research population demographically.  
Then I present political participation statistics for the group over to demonstrate a 
baseline, and I juxtapose this data with available statistics regarding the non-immigrant 
U.S. population as well as the broader population of U.S. immigrants.  I conclude with a 
summary of pertinent results and a brief review of my hypotheses and research 
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questions.  In Chapter 5, I present findings specific to Hypothesis 1, and I review 
Hypothesis 2 in Chapter 6.      
Population Demographics 
Approximately 42 percent of the research population was male, and 52.8 
percent was female.  Thirty-three percent were born in Albania, 22.2 percent in Kosovo, 
and 44.4 percent in Bosnia.  Nearly 87 percent of respondents reported bring from an 
urban center, 5.6percent were from rural areas and 7.3 percent indicated their 
hometown was suburban.  Among all participants, 41.7 percent were married currently, 
and 58.3 percent indicated their marital status as “single.”  At the time of interview, 
participants’ ranged from 20 years old to 69 years old.  The median age was 28.5, which 
is younger than the U.S. foreign-born population overall.  According to the U.S. Census 
Bureau, the median age for the total U.S. population is 36.7, and the foreign-born 
population has a median age of 40.2.  Based on participants’ birth year and the year 
they reported arriving in the United States, I calculated also an “Age at Migration.”   See 
Table 3 and Table 4 for precise age distribution on both indicators. 
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Table 3 – Participant Age at Interview 
Age at 
Interview (in 
years) 
Frequency Percent 
18-24 12 33.3 
25-34 11 30.6 
35-44 4 11.1 
45-54 6 16.7 
55-64 2 5.6 
65+ 1 2.8 
Total 36 100.0 
 
 
Table 4 – Participant Age at Migration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I asked participants to indicate their religious affiliation, if any.  Everyone fell into 
one of three groups:  47.2 percent were Muslim, 27.8 percent indicated No Religion, and 
25.0 percent were Christian.  Within the context of the survey, “Muslim” contained all 
denominations and sects of Islam.  In the survey questionnaire, I described “Christian” 
as containing the following denominations:  Protestant, Catholic, Roman Catholic, 
Age (in years) Frequency Percent 
Under 11 4 11.1 
11-17 15 41.7 
18-24 3 8.3 
25-34 7 19.4 
35-44 5 13.9 
45-54 2 5.6 
55-64 0 0 
Total 36 100.0 
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Greek, Orthodox, and Mormon.  Participants who self-identified as having “no religion” 
were agnostic, atheist, or simply indicated “no religion.” 
Participants indicated the level of education achieved in their home country as 
well as in the United States.  I present also the highest level of educational attainment, 
overall.   As Table 5 illustrates, all participants had attained some level of college 
education at the time of interview.  This is significantly higher than educational 
attainment for the general U.S. native-born populations.  In Table 6, I use data from the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s 2008 Current population survey to illustrate comparative 
educational achievement across the three populations.5 
Table 5 - Participant Level of Education 
 
Education in Country 
of Origin 
Education in US 
Highest Overall Level 
of Education 
Education Level Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency 
None 2.8 1 13.9 5 0 0 
Elementary School 27.8 10 0 0 0 0 
Middle School 16.7 6 2.8 1 0 0 
High School 13.9 5 0 0 0 0 
One Year of College 5.6 2 11.1 4 8.3 3 
Two Years of College 8.3 3 16.7 6 22.2 8 
Three Years of College 0 0 11.1 4 11.1 4 
Four Years of College 16.7 6 16.7 6 30.5 11 
Five or More Years of 
College 
8.3 3 19.4 7 27.7 10 
Course/Cert Program 0 0 8.3 3 0 0 
Total 100 36 100 36 100 36 
                                                           
5 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, "Foreign-born Workers: Labor Force Characteristics in 
2008"  
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Table 6 - Participant Education Level Compared to U.S. Foreign-Born and Native  
Education Level 
Study 
Population 
U.S. Foreign 
Born 
Population 
U.S. Native 
Born 
Population 
Less than a high school diploma 0 26.4 5.8 
High school graduates, no college 0 25.2 29.7 
Some college or associate degree 41.6 16.7 30.0 
Bachelor’s degree or higher 58.2 31.7 34.6 
 
 
Participants provided their current and former employment status.  Notably, just 
half of the population was not of working age at migration.  Table 7 depicts employment 
status.   
Table 7 - Participant Employment Status Pre- and Post-Migration 
 Employment Status in Country of Origin Employment Status in US 
 Percent Frequency Percent  Frequency 
Working 30.6 11 80.6 29 
Looking for Work 8.3 3 8.3 3 
Keeping House 2.8 1 0 0 
Going to School 8.3 3 8.3 3 
Retired 0 0 2.8 1 
Not of Working Age 50 18 0 0 
Total 100 36 100 36 
 
Considering the economic climate at the time this research was undertaken, the 
employment rate among participants is very high.  At the time of interview, the United 
States endured an economic recession that had far-reaching consequences for state and 
local unemployment rates.  At the end of 2009, the national unemployment rate was 
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10.0 percent.  In Michigan unemployment rates levied from 12.4 percent-15.6 percent, 
and in the Detroit metropolitan area, they swung between 13percent and 17.7 percent.6   
Participants provided their annual income before and after migration.  Due to 
the turbulent economic conditions and variable currency value within Albania, Kosova 
and Bosnia during the early- to mid-1990s, it is not possible to calculate equivalent 
income ranges in USD.  Conflict had also dislocated people within their country of origin, 
and in many cases, had forced people from their jobs.  In summary, all participants 
either were unemployed or earning under $25,000 USD before moving to the United 
States.  Additionally, the U.S. Census Bureau has not updated U.S. foreign-born income 
statistics since 1999.  Given incredible changes both within the foreign born population 
and in the U.S. economy over the last decade, comparing 1999 income to 2009 income 
levels is not reliable.  Instead, Table 8 provides participants’ income ranges at the time 
of interview compared to income ranges for the total U.S. population.7  
 
 
  
                                                           
6
 Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Employment status of the foreign-born and native-born populations by 
selected characteristics, 2007-08 annual averages” http://www.bls.gov/news.release/forbrn.t01.htm  
7 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2009 Annual Social and Economic Supplement, “Selected 
Characteristics of People 15 Years Old and Over by Total Money Income in 2008, Work Experience in 
2008, Race, Hispanic Origin, and Sex.” 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032009/perinc/new01_001.htm 
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Table 8 - Participant Income Compared to General U.S. Population 
 
Study 
Population 
U.S. 
Population 
 Percent Percent 
No income 13.9  
Less than $25,000 30.6 47.4 
$25,000-$35,000 8.3 13.7 
$35,000-$45,000 11.1 10.6 
$45,000-$55,000 11.1 8.0 
$55,000-$65,000 8.3 5.22 
Over $65,000 5.6 15.1 
Not of Working Age 0 n/a 
Refuse to Answer 0 n/a 
Total 100 100.0 
 
Migration and Citizenship 
 Participants described their migration and citizenship experiences.  At the time 
of interview, all participants had resided in the United States since initial arrival.  
Approximately 33 percent spoke English fluently upon arrival, and 66.7 percent did not.   
In order to assess participant’s Immigration Status at the time of entry into the United 
States, I provided closed-ended response options using terms defined by the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)8.  
Options included: 
Permanent Resident – A permanent resident is not a citizen, but resides 
legally in the United States.  Permanent residents are commonly referred 
to as “Green Card Holders.” 
 
Without Papers – I defined “without papers” to mean that the individual 
had no legally recognized immigration or citizenship status upon arrival in 
the United States. 
                                                           
8
 http://www.uscis.gov, accessed January 23, 2010. 
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Visa – A U.S. visa allows an individual entry and temporary stay in the 
United States under a certain status.  These statuses include: temporary 
worker, student or visitor. 
 
Asylee/Refugee – An individual who is “unable or unwilling” to return to 
her or his home country out of fear of persecution or harm.  According to 
USCIS, persecution must be founded on “race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  Asylees 
must reside in the United States at the time of application for asylum, 
whereas refugees typically are outside of the United States at application. 
 
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) – Temporary Protected Status (TPS) 
provides a legislative basis for individuals seeking temporary refuge in the 
United States due to armed conflict, environmental disaster, or some 
other extenuating circumstance occurring in the home country. 
 
I provided also an option for participants to specify another status if there’s was 
not listed, or simply indicate that they did not know what immigration status.  I 
summarize results in Table 9. 
Table 9 - Participant Immigration Status at Arrival in U.S. 
 Status Percent Frequency 
Permanent Resident 33.3 12 
Without Papers 5.6 2 
Tourist Visa 2.8 1 
Asylee or Refugee 50.0 18 
Temporary Protected Immigrant 2.8 1 
Other 2.8 1 
Don't Know 2.8 1 
Total 100.0 36 
 
In order to become a naturalized U.S. citizen, an individual must reside within 
the United States for at least five years.  The residency requirement may be lessened if 
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the individual applying for citizenship is married to (and resides with) a U.S. citizen for a 
minimum of three years.   Within the study population, 8.3 percent of participants were 
not yet eligible to obtain U.S. citizenship.  However, all of them had initiated the 
citizenship process and intended to become naturalized.  Within the remaining 
population eligible for citizenship, 90.9 percent of participants were U.S. citizens at the 
time of interview, and 9.1 percent were not.  This is more than double the rate of 
naturalization than that for the total U.S. foreign-born population.  According to the 
2008 American Community Survey (ACS), 43 percent the foreign born living in the 
United States were naturalized citizens.9  
Over half of the research population (52.8 percent) had been U.S. citizens for 
between five and ten years.   Another 30.6 percent had been U.S. citizens for less than 
five years.  The U.S. Government allows dual citizenship, and becoming naturalized does 
not require that an individual surrender citizenship status in their home country.  
However, home country citizenship may be forfeited if (a) the country of origin has laws 
specifically prohibiting dual citizenship, and (b) a U.S. immigrants revokes their home 
country citizenship formally.  A dual citizen is subject to the laws of both countries.  As 
such, some immigrants choose to revoke their homeland citizenship so they are not 
liable for taxes or military responsibilities in a country in which they no longer reside.  
Nearly 70 percent (69.4 percent) of the research population maintained dual citizenship 
                                                           
9
 U.S. Census Bureau, 2008 American Community Survey, http://www.census.gov/acs/www/ [Accessed 
January 27, 2010). 
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between the U.S. and their country of origin.   Just over 19 percent did not, and 11.1 
percent did not know whether or not they had dual citizenship.    
Overall, 66.7 percent of participants had lived in the United States for over ten 
years, 25 percent for five to ten years, and 8.3 percent for less than five years.   Of those 
participants were U.S. citizens at the time of interview, 2.8 percent had more than ten 
years between their arrival in the United States and citizenship, 75 percent had five to 
ten years, and 5.6 percent had less than five years.  
I asked participants to choose a primary and secondary reason for relocating 
from a list of closed-ended responses.  Specifically, I posed the question, “If you had to 
pick the statement that most fits your PRIMARY reason for relocating to the United 
States, which of these categories best describes the PRIMARY reason why you came to 
the United States?  Please choose only one response.”  Response choices included: to 
find work, to reunite with family, to get an education, to get a “better life” overall, fled 
from conflict, fled political persecution, and fled religious persecution.   Participants 
could also specify a response of “other” if they felt their answer was not listed.  I 
followed up by asking, “Using the same series of statements, what (if any) would be the 
next best statement to describe what most influenced you to move to the United 
States? Please choose only one response.”  Table 10 includes both response sets. 
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Table 10 - Participant Reason for Relocation to U.S. 
 Primary Reason Secondary Reason 
Reason for Relocating Percent Frequency Percent Frequency 
To find work 2.8 1 2.8 1 
Reunite with family 2.8 1 8.3 3 
Get an education 19.4 7 22.2 8 
Get a "better life" overall 38.9 14 25.0 9 
Fled conflict 25.0 9 13.9 5 
Fled political persecution 11.1 4 2.8 1 
Fled religious persecution 0 0 5.6 2 
No Response 0 0 19.4 7 
Totals 100 36 100 36 
 
 
In order to assign participants to a “conflict” or “non-conflict” group, I created a 
variable to indicate “presence of conflict” at the time of departure, basing the response 
for each participant on two factors:  presence of war in the country of origin at the time 
of the participants’ departure and the indication of conflict being present on the part of 
the participant in his/her open-ended response to the question, “Can you tell me why 
you decided to relocate to the United States?”    Based on these responses, 66.7 percent 
of participants experienced the presence of conflict in their country of origin, and 33.3 
percent did not.    
I asked participants whether or not they had received relocation assistance 
(monetary, legal or otherwise) from any non-governmental organization when they 
migrated from their home country to the United States.  Just over 55 percent indicated 
that they received some form or organizational support, and 44.4 percent did not.  
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Participants who received assistance mentioned the United Nations High Committee on 
Refugees (UNHCR), Red Cross, Jewish Family Services and several Lutheran faith-based 
organizations as having provided them assistance. 
Since I seek ultimately to measure differences in civic and political participation, I 
am interested also in learning whether participants interact with organizational 
structures outside of their work.  I asked participants about these affiliations, and I 
considered any interaction with a cultural, social, academic, athletic, professional or 
faith-based organization to be an organizational affiliation.  As such, 66.7 percent of 
participants indicated an organizational tie, and 33.3 percent said they had none.       
Interactions with Country of Origin 
 Participants had varied interactions with the people and systems in their 
homeland.  Just over 8 percent had never visited their country of origin since relocation, 
and 58percent visited fewer than five times.  Another 27.8 percent visited the sending 
state five to ten times, and 5.6percent visited on more than ten occasions.   Just over 80 
percent of participants indicated that they or their immediate family (as was the case 
with many younger respondents) still owned property in the country of origin, 13.9 
percent did not, and 2.8 percent were unsure.  Participants’ described their properties 
as residential, ranging from small apartments to flats and homes.  In some cases, family 
members or friends resided in the property.  In other cases, the property was rented to 
a third party. 
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Of those participants who had living parents (91.6 percent in total), 22.7 percent 
had parents still living in their country of origin only, while 60.6 percent have parents 
living in the United States only.  All participants who had children (41.7 percent of the 
total population) indicated that their children lived either in the United States or a 
European Union country.  No one reported that their children resided in the family’s 
country of origin.  Twenty-five percent of participants did not have siblings.  
Approximately 33 percent of the remaining participants had a sibling (or siblings) living 
in their country of origin only, and 59.2 percent had siblings living in the United States 
only.  Over 7 percent had siblings living in both countries.  I asked participants whether 
they felt they had more friends residing currently in the United States or their country of 
origin.  About half (52.8 percent) indicated they have more friends residing in the United 
States.  But 11.1 percent indicated they had more friends in their country of origin, and 
33.3 percent said the number of friends in each location was “about the same.”   One 
participant (2.8 percent) was unsure.  Participants were evenly split when it came to 
their opinions on repatriation.  Fifty percent said they would consider moving back to 
their home country and 50 percent said they would not.    
 Participants described the frequency with which they send financial remittances 
back to family and/or friends in their country of origin to “help out.” Similarly, I asked 
participants if they ever send money back to their country of origin to support 
“projects.”   I defined projects as “charitable works, development projects, education 
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efforts and/or schools, faith-based initiatives, or some other project.”    Table 11 
presents remittance results.   
Table 11 - Financial Remittance Frequency 
 Family/Friend Project 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency 
Never 25.0 9 66.7 24 
Once only 2.8 1 8.3 3 
Every one or two 
years 
8.3 3 8.3 3 
Once per year 16.7 6 5.6 2 
More than once per 
year 
41.7 15 5.6 2 
Total 94.4 34 34 34 
No Response 5.6 2 2 3 
 100.0 36 100.0 36 
Civic and Political Participation  
 How does an action or interaction become inherently political or civic-minded?  
There are many actions one may take that can be construed as having a civic flavor, but 
only a few that are undeniably political.  As Putnam (2000) and many other suggest, 
voting is an inherently political action taken by private citizens.  Generally, political 
activities also include political party membership and financial contributions to political 
candidates or parties. Individuals may also take avid interest in gathering information 
about political issues and causes or go so far as to contact a public official, friend of 
family member in an effort to persuade them toward their point of view. 
I asked participants to respond to a number of open- and closed-ended 
questions measuring the type and frequency of “political” activities in which people 
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engaged.  For each question, I asked specifically about activities undertaken with 
respect to both the U.S. and the participants’ country of origin.  I asked also about the 
sources from which participants gather information about political happenings in the 
United States and their home country.  Optional responses included:  public information 
(radio, newspaper, television, websites, etc.), friends and/or family, community 
organizations, other (please specify).  Participants could also specify, “I do not gather 
information about politics in my home country.” 
I asked participants generally, “Are there any political issues that are important 
to you?”  I explained that these could be issues of interest pertaining to U.S. politics, 
politics of the home state, or issues that would fall more broadly under the milieu of 
world politics” or “current events.”  Slightly over 86 percent of participants said yes, 
while 11.1 percent said no, and 2.8 percent did not know.  I followed up with an open-
ended question seeking to understand the issues of greatest importance to participants.  
I elaborate on these responses in the qualitative analysis contained in Chapter 5.   
Although exact data for the general U.S. population was not available, it is interesting to 
note the 2006 Social Capital Survey conducted by the Roper Center for Public Opinion 
research.10  Investigators asked survey respondents, “How interested are you in politics 
and national affairs?”  Respondents answered as such: 7.9 percent said “not at all,” 
                                                           
10 Social Capital Community Survey, 2006 data collected by Professor Robert D. Putnam of the Saguaro 
Seminar Civic Engagement in America, a project of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 
University and numerous community foundations nation-wide, and made available through the Roper 
Center for Public Opinion Research. 
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16.7percent said “only slightly interested,” 37.6percent said “somewhat interested,” 
and 37.8percent said “very interested.” 
 I asked participants, “Would you say you were a more politically active person 
before or after you migrated to the United States?”   I excluded participants who were 
children at relocation, which rendered 50percent of the total population eligible to 
answer the question.  Of this segment, just 8.3percent indicated that they were more 
politically active before relocating, while 22.2percent were more active after.  An 
additional 5.6percent of participants said they were “about the same” pre- and post-
migration, and 13.9percent said they were “never really politically active.” 
Next, I asked participants a series of questions intended to gauge political effects 
of migration and level of interaction with political structures in the United States versus 
the country of origin.  To start, I asked participant, “Today, are you more politically 
active with regard to U.S. political affairs or the political affairs of your home country?”  
I then followed up by asking, “Which political events are more important to you 
currently – those of the United States, or those of your home country?”  I described 
“political events” as “elections, policy change, changes to the political structure or 
political parties, etc.”  Table 12 contains results.  
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Table 12 - Political Activity and Issues Most Important 
 More Politically Active Political Issues Most Important 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
US 15 41.7 20 55.6 
Country of Origin 1 2.8 3 8.3 
About the same in both 11 30.6 12 33.3 
Not active in either 9 25.0 1 2.8 
Total 36 100.0 36 100 
 
 The survey questionnaire sought to establish political further political behaviors, 
especially those associated with such overt political activities as voting, political 
partisanship, and making financial contributions to political causes.  I use Table 13 to 
describe participants’ voting habits.  Participants were asked whether or not they had 
voted in an election in the Unites States or their country of origin since relocating to the 
United States.  In other words, in order to be counted as a “yes,” the participants vote in 
either country had to be cast since they have lived in the United States.     
Table 13 - Participant Voting Behavior 
 U.S. Election Country of Origin Election 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Not Eligible to Vote  5 13.9 0 0 
Yes 23 63.9 5 13.9 
No 8 22.2 31 86.1 
Total 36 100.0 36 100.0 
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 This is comparable to general U.S. election voter turnout.  The General Social 
Survey (GSS) reports that 66.9 percent of survey respondents voted in the 2004 U.S. 
Presidential election, while 24.0 percent did not, and 9.1 percent were ineligible.11   
Participants provided also their political party affiliations.  I asked participants to 
provide only those party affiliations that they held at the time of interview and not 
previously.  Nearly 37 percent claimed no U.S. political party affiliation.  The remaining 
participants were 50percent Democrats, 5.6 percent Republicans, 8.3 percent 
Independent, and 5.6percent “other.”  Over 19 percent of participants claimed they 
were affiliated with a political party on their home country, and 80.6percent were not.  
Another common measure of political engagement is political candidate or party 
contributions.  The GSS reports that 21.1 percent of their survey respondents had made 
a political contribution over the last three to four years to “a political party or candidate 
or any other political cause.” The remaining 78.9 percent had not.12  I asked participants 
how often they had made financial contributions to political candidates and political 
parties since relocating.  These could be contributions to a United States entity or an 
entity in the country of origin.  I present participant responses in Table 14.   
 
                                                           
11
 Davis, James Allan and Smith, Tom W. General social surveys, 1972-2008[machine-readable data file] 
/Principal Investigator, James A. Davis; Director and Co-Principal Investigator, Tom W. Smith; Co-Principal 
Investigator, Peter V. Marsden; Sponsored by National Science Foundation. --NORC ed.-- Chicago: 
National Opinion Research Center [producer]; Storrs, CT: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 
University of Connecticut [distributor], 2009. 
12
 Ibid. 
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Table 14 - Financial Contribution to Candidates and/or Parties 
 Candidate or Party in the United 
States 
Candidate or Party in Country of 
Origin 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Never 24 66.7 33 97.1 
Once only 5 13.9 1 2.8 
Every one or two 
years 
6 16.7 2 5.6 
Once per year 1 2.8 0 0 
Total 36 100.0 36 100.0 
 
 The GSS also provides statistics on survey respondents’ interactions with public 
figures.  Approximately 22.3 percent of respondents had “contacted or attempted to 
contact a politician or civil servant to express their views” within the last year.13  
Another 20.9 percent of respondents indicated having done so in “the more distant 
past.”  I spoke with study participants about their direct interactions with political 
figures by asking, “Since you relocated to the United States, have you contacted any 
political figure in the United States to relay your views on some issue?”  I described 
“political figures” as “elected officials, bureaucrats, federal, state or local leaders, etc.”  I 
then followed up with the same question, applicable instead to political figures in the 
country of origin.  Results are shown in Table 15. 
 
 
                                                           
13
 Ibid. 
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Table 15 - Interaction with Political Figures 
 
Contacted US Political Figure 
Contacted Political Figure in 
Country of Origin 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Never 24 66.7 31 86.1 
Once only 5 13.9 1 2.8 
Once per year 2 5.6 0 0 
Every one or two 
years 
0 0 1 2.8 
More than once 
per year 
5 13.9 3 8.3 
Total 36 100.0 36 100.0 
 
 
The GSS asks, “When you hold as strong opinion about politics, how often do you 
try to persuade your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views?”   To 
which 12.5 percent of respondents indicated, “often,” and 29.2 percent said, 
“sometimes.” Thirty-three percent said, “rarely,” while the remaining 25.3 percent said, 
“never.”14 
I wanted to measure less structured, more personal mechanisms of political 
participation within this research population as well.  “Since you relocated to the United 
States, have you used any of these means to influence people’s opinions about politics?  
In this case, I’m interested in how you’ve communicated with people living in the United 
States.  Please select all that apply.”  Response options included: Letter, Email, Internet 
Blog, Phone Call, Boycott some business or product, Other (please specify).  I then asked 
                                                           
14
 Ibid. 
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the same question with regard to influence exerted on individuals living in the 
participants’ country of origin.  Upon analyzing the results, I found that it was less 
important which means of communication an individual was using, as it was how many.  
This approach lent a better lens for frequency and intensity of interaction.  See results 
summarized in Table 16.   
Table 16 - Methods Use to Influence Political Opinions 
 U.S. Country of Origin 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
None 20 55.6 23 63.9 
One 7 19.4 7 19.4 
Two 4 11.1 5 13.9 
Three 2 5.6 1 2.8 
Four 1 2.8 0 0 
Six or more 2 5.6 0 0 
Total 36 100.0 36 100.0 
 
 Now that I’ve described the general demographic and political participation 
characteristics of the of the research population, I turn toward examining my 
hypotheses and reporting results of the surveys and data analyses.   I examine first the 
in-group comparison and then draw comparisons between the conflict and non-conflict 
groups. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – CONFLICT GROUP SENDING AND 
RECEVING STATE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
  
In Hypothesis 1, I posit that conflict migrants participate in politics more in their 
sending state than in their receiving state post-resettlement.  Previous research 
demonstrates that there is typically a transnational dimension to contemporary 
migrants’ economic, political and social spheres.   I suggested that conflict migrants 
would participate more in the sending state than the receiving state, for several 
reasons.  For one, the “suddenness” of departure leaves conflict migrants little time to 
accept the emergent distance to family, friends, and property as well as learn the 
language and customs of the receiving community.  Many conflict migrants seek to stay 
engaged or even to repatriate to the homestate. 
Research questions related to Hypothesis 1 include:   
• Is there a transnational dimension to political participation for conflict 
migrants? 
• Are some resettled conflict migrants more likely to participate in sending 
state politics post-settlement than others? 
• What factors influenced conflict migrants’ engagement in the sending versus 
receiving state? 
 
Since the second research question is so similar to the hypothesis, I refocused 
my efforts toward examining additional questions as well.   For instance, do such factors 
as property ownership in the home state or frequent return trips to the homestate 
influence conflict migrants’ engagement in the sending versus receiving state?  Are 
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some resettled conflict migrants more likely to participation in sending state politics 
than others? 
 I cross-tabulated all of my dependent variables and control variables, and then 
selected the most significant for further correlational testing.  These included country of 
origin, gender, religion and age at interview.  I reference these cross-tabulations and 
correlations throughout this chapter to illustrate findings.  I conclude that the conflict 
group overall participated more in U.S. politics than sending state politics, which was a 
null finding.  Across all indicators, participants were more engaged politically in the 
receiving state than the sending state.  I conclude this chapter with a summary of these 
indicators, and suggest reasons for the finding.   
Sending and Receiving State Activity Comparisons 
To start, I asked conflict group participants what “political issues” were 
important to them.  This question was open-ended and participants could identify issues 
pertaining to the sending state, receiving state, world politics or really any area of 
interest to them.  Over 83 percent identified a political issue of importance to them, and 
over 16 percent did not.   Fifty five percent of respondents specified a political issue 
related to their sending state.  Issues specific to Bosnia and Kosovo include:  economic 
stability, civil rights, government corruption, state sovereignty and preservation of 
democracy.  Remaining participants spoke of war, human rights, U.S. economic 
recovery, U.S. health care reform, and U.S. immigration reform.  All of the participants 
who did not express an issue area of importance to them were women.  Over 66 
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percent were Bosnian, and 33.3 percent were Kosovar.  The responses were spread 
evenly across religious affiliations with one participant being Christian, one Muslim and 
one having no religion.  Just over 33 percent were under 31 and 66 percent were over 
31. 
In a closed-ended response, I asked participants if they had any interest in U.S. 
foreign policy toward their sending state.  Over 83 percent said yes, and 16.7 percent 
said no.   Seventy-five percent of those who said no were Bosnian, and 25 percent were 
Kosovar.  Seventy five percent were women, and 25 percent were men.  Fifty percent 
had no religion, 25 percent were Christian and 25 percent were Muslim.  There was no 
so significant association between variables, as demonstrated by the correlation tests in 
Appendix A.   
 I employed also closed-ended and scaled comparative behavioral measures.   In 
other words, I included questions asking, “Do you engage in this political behavior in the 
United States?” and then “Do you engage in this same political behavior in your sending 
state?”  Participants selected the number of means by which they gathered political 
information about their sending and receiving state.   Possible means of gathering 
information included public information sources (such as newspapers and magazines, 
Internet resources, television and radio, etc.), friends and family, and community 
organizations.  Participants could also indicate any methods used that I had not listed, 
and I included those responses in the frequency distributions.  I provide these 
distributions in Table 17. 
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Table 17 - Means Used to Gather Political Information (Conflict Group) 
 United States Politics Sending State Politics 
Number of 
Means Used 
Frequency Percent Frequency  Percent 
None 1 4.2 2 8.3 
One 19 79.2 14 58.3 
Two  2 8.3 6 25.0 
Three 2 8.3 2 8.3 
 
Comparatively, 95.8 percent of conflict participants used one or more means to 
obtain information about US politics, and 91.6 percent used one or more means to 
obtain information about country of origin politics.  However, only 16.6 percent use 
more than one means to gather information about U.S. politics, while 33.3 percent use 
more than one means to gather information about sending state politics.   So, while 
slightly more participants gathered information about the receiving state, participants 
used slightly more information sources in the sending state than they so in the receiving 
state.  The only participant who did not gather information about U.S. politics was a 
Christian Bosnian woman who was over 31 years old.  Both of the participants who did 
not gather political information about the sending state were Christian Bosnian women 
over 31 years old.  I include my correlation tests in Tables X and X (Appendix A) to 
illustrate that none of the control variables significantly predicted the number of means 
used to gather political information. 
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 I asked conflict group participants who were legal U.S. citizens (95.8 percent of 
the group) whether they had ever voted in a U.S. election.   Eighty-seven percent of 
eligible participants had voted in a U.S. election, and 13 percent had not.  Non-voters 
were 66.7 percent Bosnian and 33.3 percent Kosovar.  They were 66.7 percent male, 
and 33.3 percent female.  Most (66.7 percent) were Muslim, and 33.3 percent were 
Christian.  Nearly 67 percent were under 31, and 33.3 percent were over 31 years old.   
Conversely, 20.8 percent of conflict group participants voted in their sending state since 
resettlement, and nearly 80 percent did not.  Eighty percent of those who voted in their 
home country were Bosnian, and 20 percent were Kosovar.  Sixty percent were men, 
and 40 percent were women.  Sixty percent were Muslim, and 40 percent had no 
religion.  Forty percent were under 31 and 60 percent were over 31.  Correlations 
contained in Appendix A indicated no significant associations with control variables. 
Over 70 percent of the conflict group affiliated with a U.S. political party.  The 
majority of participants (62.5 percent) were Democrats, and 8.3 percent were 
Independents.  None were Republican.  Over 29 percent had no party affiliation.  
Participants without a U.S. political party affiliation were 71.4 percent Bosnian and 28.6 
percent were Kosovar.  Just over 51 percent were men, and 42.9 percent were women.  
Over 71 percent were Muslim, 14.3 percent were Christian and 14.3 percent had no 
religion.  Nearly 43 percent were under 31 years old, and 57.1 percent were over 31 
years old.  Twenty one percent affiliated with sending state political parties.  Eighty 
percent were Bosnian, and 20 percent were Kosovar.  Sixty percent were men, and 40 
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percent were women.  Sixty percent were Muslim, and 40 percent had no religion.  
Most (80 percent) were under 31 at the time of interview, and 20 percent were older.  
There were no significant relationships between political party affiliation and the control 
variables. 
I followed the political party affiliation questions with questions about financial 
contributions to sending and receiving state political parties and candidates.  Over 33 
percent of the conflict group had made contributions to U.S. candidate or party at least 
once since resettlement, and 66.7 percent had never done so.  Those who did not 
contribute money were approximately 69 percent Bosnian and 31 percent Kosovar.  
Over 62 percent were women, and 37.5 percent were men.  Over 56 percent were 
Muslim, 25 percent had no religion and 18.8 percent were Christians.  Just over 56 
percent were under 31, and 43.8 percent were over 31 years old.  Only 8.4 percent of 
participants had made a financial contribution to a party in the sending state, and 91.7 
percent had not.  Of those participants that did make a contribution to a sending state 
party or candidate, one was from Bosnia and one was from Kosovo.  Both were men 
under 31 years old who indicated they had no religion.  Results in Appendix A reveal no 
significant correlations. 
Over 79 percent of conflict group participants had never contacted a U.S. 
political figure, but the remaining 20.8 percent contacted someone at least once.  Over 
8 percent contacted an official once per year, and another 8 percent contacted 
someone more than once per year.   Thos who did contact someone were 80 percent 
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Kosovar and 20 percent Bosnian.  Sixty percent were women, and 40 percent were men.  
Sixty percent had no religion, 20 percent were Christian, and 20 percent were Muslim.  
Sixty percent were younger than 31, and 40 percent were older.  The relationship 
between country of origin and U.S. political contact was significant at x2(3) = .698, p = 
.011.  As I discuss in-depth in Chapter 6, I believe this association is due, in part, to a 
strong connection between Kosovars and their more politically established Albanian 
counterparts.  The Albanians, having a long generational presence in the Detroit area, 
have a significant history of cultural organization and business investment in the area.  
As such, they have paved more in-roads with local politicians, and they frequently share 
this access with members of the Kosovar population.   
 The number of participants contacting sending state political figures was 
comparable to receiving state contact.  Some 83.3 percent of the conflict group never 
made contact with a political figure, and over 16 percent contacted someone with 
frequency ranging from once only to more than once a year.  Seventy five percent of 
those who did were Kosovar, and 25 percent were Bosnian.  The participants were split 
at 50 percent men and 50 percent women.  Fifty percent were Muslim, 25 percent were 
Christian and 25 percent had no religion.  Participants were also evenly split by age with 
50 percent being under 31 and 50 percent being older than 31 years.  Correlational tests 
between controls and sending state political participation were insignificant.  These 
results are in Tables X and X in Appendix A. 
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 I asked participants to indicate how many methods they use to “influence other 
people’s opinions about politics.  Possible choices included email, direct calling, letter-
writing, protesting, and boycotting.  Participants were allowed to indicate methods mot 
listed on the questionnaire as well.  Over 37 percent of participants said they tried to 
influence the political opinion of someone living in the United States, and 62.5 percent 
did not.  Those who did were 66.7 percent Bosnian, and 33.3 percent Kosovar.  Nearly 
67 percent were male, and 33.3 percent were female.  Over 44 percent were Muslim, 
33.3 percent had no religion, and 22.2 percent were Christian.  Nearly 56 percent were 
under 31, and 44.4 percent were 31 or older. As shown in Appendix A, none of the 
control variables statistically correlated with attempts to influence U.S. political 
opinions.  
Results for influencing political opinions of people in the sending state were very 
similar to those for the receiving state with 66.7 percent never doing so, and 33.3 
percent using one or more means of influence.  Of those who did try to influence 
sending state opinions, 62.5 percent were Bosnian, and 37.5 percent were Kosovar.  
Over 63 percent were men, and 37.5 percent were women.  Results were spread across 
religious affiliation with 37.5 percent being Christian, 37.5 percent having nor religion, 
and 25 percent being Muslim.  Over 37.5 percent were under 31 years, and 62.5 percent 
were over 31 years old.   There were no statistically significant relationships between 
variables, demonstrated in Appendix A, Tables X and X.   
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 When seeking to understand if participants were more or less politically active 
after migrating to the United States, I excluded participants who were young children at 
the time of resettlement, because they said they felt were too young to be independent 
political actors prior to resettlement.  This ruled out 45.0 percent of the total group.  
Responses for before/after migration were the same with 23.1 percent saying before, 
and 23.1 percent saying after.  Over 15 percent said they felt they had the same level of 
involvement before and after migration, and 38.5 percent said they were never really 
active.  There were no characteristics distinguishing one response set or another with 
the exception of the “was never active” results.  Eighty percent of those who said they 
were never really active were women, and all of them were Bosnian.  They were spread 
across religions with 60 percent being Christian, 20 percent Muslim, and 20 percent 
having no religion.  All of them were over 34 years old.  I did not detect any statistically 
significant associations.   
 I asked participants which political events were most important to them – those 
of the sending state or those in the receiving state.  Nearly 67 percent said U.S. politics 
were of greater importance to them.  Over 29 percent of respondents said that country 
of origin political events had the same importance to them as U.S. political events.  Just 
one participant (4.2 percent) indicated that country of origin political events were more 
important to her. Correlation tests revealed no statistically significant relationships 
between controls and dependent variables.  Appendix A contains findings.   
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I asked participants outright whether they were more politically active in the 
sending or receiving state at the time of interview.  No one said they were more active 
in their sending state than their receiving state.  Forty-one percent said they were more 
active in U.S. politics, and nearly 38 percent said their activity was “about the same in 
both.”  Within this subset, 66.7 percent of these participants were Bosnian, and 33.3 
percent were Kosovar.  Additionally, 66.7 percent were men, and 33.3 percent were 
women.  Nearly 67 percent were Muslim, 22.2 percent had no religion, and 11.1 percent 
were Christian.  The findings in Appendix A indicate that none of the control variables 
significantly predict importance of political events.   
Comparing Conflict Group Political Participation Scores 
 I calculated a “political participation score” for each participant based on a fixed 
number of points per response to questions about political behavior.  The lowest 
possible score was zero, and the highest was 20.  Actual scores for US participation 
spread from 2 to 13 points, and the median score was 4.5 with a standard deviation of 
2.75.  The mean score was 5.29.  I provide the spread of all scores in Table 18. 
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Table 18 - Conflict Group Mean Political Participation Scores (Receiving State) 
Points Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
2.00 3 12.5 12.5 
3.00 5 20.8 33.3 
4.00 4 16.7 50.0 
5.00 1 4.2 54.2 
6.00 4 16.7 70.8 
7.00 2 8.3 79.2 
8.00 2 8.3 87.5 
9.00 2 8.3 95.8 
13.00 1 4.2 100.0 
Total 24 100.0  
 
 Just 37.5 percent of Bosnians scored higher than the median score, compared to 
75 percent of Kosovars.  Gender scores were almost exactly the inverse of one another.  
Just over 36 percent of men scored below the median score, and 63.6 percent scored 
higher.  Conversely, 61.5 percent of women scored below the median, and 38.5 percent 
scored higher.  Participants also the exact inverse when it came to age.  Nearly 42 
percent of participants under 34 percent scored below the median U.S. political 
participation score, and 58.3 percent scored higher.   Interestingly, 71.4 percent of 
participants citing “no religion” scored above the median, and 28.6 percent scored 
below.  This compared to 40.0 percent of Christians with higher then median scores, and 
47.7 percent of Muslims. In the over 31 age group, 58.3 percent scored below the 
median, and 41.7 percent scored above.  None of the cross-tabulations between U.S. 
political participation score and the control variables were statistically significant.     
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Sending state participation scores were lower than receiving state participation 
scores.  They ranged from spread from 0 to 13 points, with the median score being 3.0.  
The mean score was 3.25, and the standard deviation was 2.78.  Table 19 contains the 
spread of all scores. 
Table 19 - Conflict Group Mean Political Participation Scores (Sending State) 
Points Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
.00 2 8.3 8.3 
1.00 4 16.7 25.0 
2.00 5 20.8 45.8 
3.00 4 16.7 62.5 
4.00 4 16.7 79.2 
5.00 3 12.5 91.7 
8.00 1 4.2 95.8 
13.00 1 4.2 100.0 
Total 24 100.0  
 
As with receiving state participation scores, none of the subsequent cross-
tabulations for sending state participation were statistically significant.  Bosnians and 
Kosovars had exactly the same number of participants below and above the median 
scores – 62.5 percent of both scored below the median, and 37.5 percent above the 
median.  Just over 45.5 percent of men scored below the median score, and 54.5 
percent scored higher.  Conversely, 76.9 percent of women scored below the median, 
and 23.1 percent scored higher.  Among those under 31 years old, 66.7 percent scored 
below the median, and 33.3 percent scored higher.  In the over 31 age group, 58.3 
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percent scored below the median and 41.7 percent scored above.  The distribution for 
participants over 31 years old was the same for receiving state participation as it was for 
U.S. political participation.  Nearly 43 percent of participants citing “no religion” scored 
above the median, and 57.1 percent scored below.  This compared to 40.0 percent of 
Christians with higher then median scores, and 33.3 percent of Muslims.  There were no 
statistically significant associations between the control and receiving state political 
participation scores. 
Summary of Results 
In assessing the effects of conflict experience on political participation, I 
could not reject the null hypothesis.  Conflict migrants participated politically more 
in their receiving state than their sending state for every indicator analyzed, 
including a comparison of overall mean political participation scores.  Table X 
summarizes results across all political indicators.   
Table 20 - Hypothesis 1 Political Indicators Summary 
  Indicator Sending 
State 
Receiving 
State 
Gathered Information about Politics 92% 96% 
Voted in Election 21% 87% 
Political Party Affiliation 21% 70% 
Contributed Money to Political Candidate/Party 8% 33% 
Contacted Political Figure 16% 21% 
Attempted to Influence Political Opinions 33% 36% 
Mean Political Participation Score 3.25 5.29 
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Perhaps the most straightforward conclusion can be drawn simply from the 
questions asking participants outright where they allocate more activity and which 
events are most important to them.  By participants’ own admission, they do not 
participate more in their sending state than their receiving state, nor were sending 
state politics more important to them.  I summarize these results in Table 21.  
Table 21 - Self-Identified Sending/Receiving State Activity (Conflict Group) 
Indicator Sending State US Same 
More Politically Active Overall* 0 41% 36% 
Political Issues Most Important 4% 67% 29% 
       *This distribution does not total 100%, because 23% of participants indicated that they are not politically  
        active at all in either locale.   
 
Overall results demonstrate that there is a transnational dimension to political 
participation for some conflict migrants, but not the majority I had hypothesized.  
Qualitative interview responses provided some insight into participation patterns, some 
of which was noteworthy.  For instance, almost all participants continued to gather 
political information about their sending state via Internet news sources, family and 
friends residing in the sending state, and community organizations. 
Participation in such activities as voting and engaging with political parties was 
less common in the sending state than it was in the receiving state. Having gained 
additional insight about voting processes from the participants, I was surprised that 
even 20 percent had cast a sending state vote.  Participants expressed a great deal of 
confusion about their sending state citizenship rights the institutional response to their 
displacement.  There were barriers to accessing information and resources necessary to 
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vote in their homeland, and some misunderstanding about eligibility.  As one Bosnian 
participant said, “No [I did not vote], but I really wanted to.  I tried to vote, but could 
not.”  
Another Bosnian participant described perceptions of sending state Bosnian 
woman, 28 corruption as being a possible deterrent to casting a vote,  In her town, for 
example, she blamed party politics and cronyism for a government shutdown that 
occurred in her home city and left many feeling discouraged.  She said,   
The [United Nations] ambassadors were targeting people living in diaspora, 
you know, in the U.S. or anywhere, and they had a really low turnout.  I 
think that because of the way things worked out [in the home state], a lot of 
people were just discouraged.  People were telling me, “Why don’t you go 
vote?”  But I’m thinking if I voted, it wouldn’t have really mattered. 
 
Although contact of political officials was low for both the sending and receiving 
state, I observed that all contact with U.S. officials centered around sending state issues, 
thus making the action transnational.  The only statistically significant relationship was 
between contact of U.S. political figures and country of origin.  Kosovars exhibited 
higher rates of contact with U.S. officials than Bosnians, and they provided examples of 
interactions focused on the “Albanian cause” and issues related to Kosovar 
independence.  Regardless of country of origin, gender, religion or age, all of the 
participants who had contacted a U.S. political figure did so to discuss issues relevant to 
the sending state.  So although the action was initiated within a U.S. political structure, 
the interaction was undertaken to produce an outcome in the sending state.   
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A 46-year old Kosovar woman explained her involvement in contacting U.S. 
political officials to request they intervene in the imprisonment of political prisoners in 
Montenegro,  
We went many times to Washington DC about Kosova, Albania and 
Montenegro.  We are very active as a community.  They [political prisoners] 
been in jail for two years over there, and the reason why they are out is 
because we did a lot as a community.  We initiate the things through [U.S.] 
government, and government react over there, and they are free now…And 
we had a lot of community dinners for Wesley Clark and Senator Levin and 
all them.  David Bonior and all of them, they were there.  I went on those 
events all the time.  My husband actually went and met Hillary Clinton, too. 
 
A 24-yeard old Kosovar woman echoed similar interactions,  “I’ve met with Debbie 
Stabenow, Carl Levin and [David] Bonior…I’ve attended some of the rallies of Al Gore’s, 
when he was running, and I helped out during that time a little bit…It was more for the 
Albanian cause.”  I conducted an anecdotal interview with a Bosnian man who was not 
meet study criteria.  He explained also, “I contacted all of them.  These issues were 
related mostly to the genocide in Bosnia.  I got responses – I’m satisfied.” 
Nearly as many people attempted to influence sending state political opinions as 
there were receiving state political opinions.  Perhaps most interesting was the 
pervasive use of Internet-based social networks, email distributions and blogs to shape 
sending state opinions.  I discuss further the use of technology in shaping transnational 
political action in my concluding chapter.  A Bosnian participant in her late-20s 
explained her rationale for attempting to influence opinions in her sending state, 
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I think – I mean especially when you’ve lived in another country like the 
United States that’s so much more organized.  It has its negatives of course, 
but it’s still a very powerful country for a reason.  And I think once you’ve 
seen that, and then you move back to Bosnia or any other country, you just 
kind of have to get involved because you can’t keep your mouth shut.  
Because you’ve learned a lot of things here and just kind of feel like you 
have a voice, and you should have a voice.  You know, you just don’t want to 
be quiet about so many things.  So I can see myself getting involved. 
 
Participants who said their political activity was “about the same in both” the 
sending and receiving states explained their sense of duality about which political 
events were most important to them.   A 41-year old Kosovar woman said, 
It’s hard because I love my country.  Also, I love United States.  They are 
equally important because I live here, my kids live here, my friends, 
everybody.  But also in Kosovo, I still have family, I still have friends. So 
equally [important], I could say. 
A 23 year-old Kosovar woman explained,  
 
I mean I live here.  I want to know more about different things here.  But I’m 
involved also in Kosova politics in different ways…I went to Indiana with the 
U.S. Army, and I actually prepared the soldiers [for] when they go back to 
Kosova with language, culture…how to use an interpreter, role-playing…This 
way, I can help the U.S. and Kosova at the same time. 
 
A female Bosnian participant explained her “about the same” response as well 
 
I think I’m probably more informed about Bosnian politics because I’m 
constantly reading the newspapers and watching the news and everything.  
But when it comes to involvement in terms of voting and everything, that’s 
more here. 
 
Although overall statistical correlations were insignificant, I noted several trends 
worthy of discussion.  For one, older Bosnian women participated in political structures 
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(sending and receiving state) less so than others.  Several commented also on the desire 
to withdraw from political activity overall.  Additionally, participants under 31 years old 
participated in sending state political structures more than I anticipated given that in 
most cases they had lived in the United States longer than then they lived in their 
sending state.  I elaborate on gendered transnationalism and generational effects in the 
final chapter as well. 
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CHAPTER SIX – COMPARING PARTICIPATION BETWEEN  
CONFLICT AND NON-CONFLICT GROUPS 
 
 In Hypotheses 2, I suggest that conflict-driven migrants will participate in sending 
state politics more than non-conflict migrants.  I proposed also the following research 
questions in relation to Hypothesis 2: 
• Is there a transnational dimension to political participation for conflict 
migrants and non-conflict migrants? 
• Are some conflict migrants more likely than non-conflict migrants to 
participate in sending state politics post-settlement? 
• What factors influenced non-conflict migrants’ engagement in the 
sending versus receiving state? 
 
I suggest that conflict migrants will engage in sending state politics more so than 
receiving state politics for several reasons.  Primarily, non-conflict migrants typically 
have made advance preparations for relocation such as obtaining English language 
instruction and lining up housing, educational and employment opportunities.  .  They 
also have more financial capital and pre-established connections to family or social 
support networks.  Therefore, non-conflict migrants generally arrive in their receiving 
community with more social capital than conflict migrants and are better prepared to 
engage in assimilation processes in the receiving community.  This means they are more 
likely than conflict migrants to incorporate politically in the receiving community.  
Conflict migrants never intended to leave their home state, so they never had an 
opportunity to prepare for relocation emotionally, culturally, financially.  This may 
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influence them to take greater stake in sending state politics and remain an active 
participant in sending state structures after relocation.   
Political Indicators 
When making comparisons between the conflict group and non-conflict group, I 
used the same set of political indicators and I used conflict/non-conflict group 
assignment.  Just over 83 percent of the conflict group said there were political issues 
“of importance to them” compared with 91.7 percent of the non-conflict group.  Just 
over 83 percent of the conflict group said U.S. foreign policy toward their home country 
was important to them, while every participant in the non-conflict group did.  Conflict 
group status did not predict results.  These correlation tables are included in Appendix 
B.   
Comparatively, 95.8 percent of the conflict group used one or more means to 
obtain information about US politics, and 91.7 percent used one or more means.  
However, only 16.6 percent of the conflict group used more than one means to gather 
information about U.S. politics, while 50 percent of the conflict group used more than 
one means to gather information about sending state politics.   So, while slightly more 
participants gather information about the receiving state, non-conflict participants 
engage with more U.S.-based information sources than conflict participants.  Table 22 
contains frequencies.   
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Table 22 - Means Used to Gather Receiving State Political Information (Between 
Group) 
 Conflict Group Non-Conflict Group 
Number of 
Means Used 
Frequency Percent Frequency  Percent 
None 1 4.2 1 8.3 
One 19 79.2 5 41.7 
Two  2 8.3 4 33.3 
Three 2 8.3 2 16.7 
 
 With regard to sending state political information gathering, the conflict group 
and non-conflict group exhibited comparable patterns of behavior.  The non-conflict 
group gathered sending state information with the exact same number of means as they 
used to gather U.S. political information, and they used slightly more means to do so 
than the conflict group did. Please see results in Table 23.   
Table 23 - Means Used to Gather Sending State Political Information (Between Group) 
 Conflict Group Non-Conflict Group 
Number of 
Means Used 
Frequency Percent Frequency  Percent 
None 2 8.3 1 8.3 
One 14 58.3 5 41.7 
Two  6 25.0 4 33.3 
Three 2 8.3 2 16.7 
 
 
 Among those eligible to vote (U.S. citizens over 18 years old) 87.0 percent of the 
conflict group voted in the receiving state, compared with just 37.5 percent of the non-
conflict group.  Pearson Chi-Square tests demonstrated a statistically significant 
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relationship between conflict/non-conflict group status and voting in a U.S. Election 
with x2 (1) = 7.582 and p = .006.   
While 20.8 percent of the conflict group voted in the sending state, no one from 
the non-conflict group did.  The relationship between conflict group status and sending 
state voting was not statistically significant, however.  I provide these correlation 
procedures in Appendix A. 
Over 70 percent of the conflict group had a U.S. political party affiliation, 
compared to 66.7 percent of the non-conflict group.  Nearly 20.8 percent of the conflict 
group affiliated with a sending state party, compared to 16.7 percent of the non-conflict 
group.  Group status was not correlated with wither U.S. or sending states political party 
affiliation. 
When it came to contributing money to U.S. candidates, the groups 
demonstrated equal activism.  Within both groups, 33.3 percent of participants 
contributed to a U.S. candidate or party and 66.7 percent of each group had never made 
a contribution to a U.S. political candidate or party.  The participants who did varied in 
the frequency of donation:   16.7 percent of the conflict group had contributed once 
only; 8.3 percent of the non-conflict group had contributed once only; 16.7 percent of 
each group contributed every one or two years, and 16.7 percent of the non-conflict 
group contributed more than once a year, while none of the conflict group did.  The 
groups were matched also on their financial contributions to sending state political 
parties and candidates.  In both groups, 91.7 percent had never made a contribution to 
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a sending state political party (since relocating to the United States), and the remaining 
8.3 percent of both groups had.  The relationship between conflict group status and 
contributions to U.S. political parties was not significant. 
Contacting a US political figure was higher among non-conflict participants with 
20.8 percent of conflict participants contacting a U.S. official, and 58.3 percent of non-
conflict participants contacting a U.S. official.  Conflict or non-conflict group status was a 
predictor of contacting U.S. officials with x2 (3) = .505 and p =.027, and Lambda = .333 
with p =.196.  As discovered among the conflict group participants, the non-conflict 
group also engaged with U.S. political officials to discuss issues relevant to the sending 
state.   
Although twice as many non-conflict participants than non-conflict participants 
contacted U.S. officials, twice as many people in the conflict group contacted a sending 
state political figure than the non-conflict group.  In the conflict group, 16.7 percent of 
people contacted a sending state official, compared to just 8.3 percent of the non-
conflict group.  There were no significant associations between conflict/non-conflict 
group status and contact with country of origin political figures.   
Conflict group members did not use as many means of influencing U.S. political 
opinions as the non-conflict group.  Over 35 percent of the conflict group used one or 
more methods to influence U.S. political opinions, compared to 41.6 percent of the non-
conflict group.  Conflict groups used slightly more means than the non-conflict-group, 
however.  The distribution is provided in Table 24.  Correlation tests were insignificant. 
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 There were fewer methods used to influence sending state political opinions, 
overall.  Just over 33 percent of conflict group participants used one or more methods of 
influence, compared to 41.7 percent of non-conflict participants.  There were no 
statistical associations.  Table 25 contains these results.  
 Table 24 - Methods Used to Influence U.S. Opinions (Between Groups) 
   Conflict 
Non-
Conflict 
Total 
Methods Used to Influence 
Political Opinions - US 
None 
Count 15 5 20 
Percent 62.5% 41.7% 55.6% 
One 
Count 3 4 7 
Percent 12.5% 33.3% 19.4% 
Two 
Count 3 1 4 
Percent 12.5% 8.3% 11.1% 
Three 
Count 2 0 2 
Percent 8.3% .0% 5.6% 
Four 
Count 1 0 1 
Percent 4.2% .0% 2.8% 
Six or more 
Count 0 2 2 
Percent .0% 16.7% 5.6% 
Total 
Count 24 12 36 
Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 25 - Methods Used to Influence Sending State Opinions (Between Groups) 
   Conflict 
Non-
Conflict 
Total 
Methods Used to Influence 
Political Opinions - COO 
None 
Count 16 7 23 
Percent 66.7% 58.3% 63.9% 
One 
Count 4 3 7 
Percent 16.7% 25.0% 19.4% 
Two 
Count 3 2 5 
Percent 12.5% 16.7% 13.9% 
Three 
Count 1 0 1 
Percent 4.2% .0% 2.8% 
Total 
Count 24 12 36 
Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
When it came to being politically active pre- and post-migration, no one in the 
non-conflict group said they were never really active, which differs from the conflict 
group.   When excluding cases where the participant was a young child at the time of 
migration, 23.1 percent of the conflict group said they were more active before 
migration, 23.1 percent were more active after migration, and 15.4 percent said they 
had the same level of involvement.  Every person in the non-conflict group who 
migrated as an adult said they were more politically active after migrating to the United 
States.  The association between group and level of activity was not significant, 
however.    
When I asked participants whether they were currently more politically active in 
their sending or receiving state, results were mixed.  Both groups had the same 
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percentage of participants who said they were more active in the United States.  More 
non-conflict participants than conflict participants selected “about the same.”  However, 
tests did not reveal statistically significance between conflict group status and political 
activity.  Only one person in the entire study population said they were more active in 
their sending state.  I provide cross-tabulation procedures in Table 26. 
Table 26 - Political Activity in the Sending and Receiving State (Between Groups) 
   Conflict 
Non-
Conflict 
Total 
More Politically Active 
in US or Country of 
Origin 
US 
Count 10 5 15 
Percent 41.7% 41.7% 41.7% 
Country of Origin 
Count 0 1 1 
Percent .0% 8.3% 2.8% 
About the same 
in both 
Count 9 2 11 
Percent 37.5% 16.7% 30.6% 
Not active in 
either 
Count 5 4 9 
Percent 20.8% 33.3% 25.0% 
Total 
Count 24 12 36 
Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
More participants from the non-conflict group said sending state politics were 
more important or held about the same importance to them as U.S. politics. Within the 
conflict group, 33 percent said sending state issues were of the same of more 
importance to them then receiving state issues, compared to 58.4 percent of the non-
conflict group.  The relationship between conflict status and political issues of 
importance was statistically insignificant.    
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A Bosnian women described why sending state issues held equal importance to 
receiving state issues for her,  
Well, my dream is to come back there and live there….I have a lot of friends 
and family members there, and they’ve just been through so much that I 
wish everything would be 100 perfect, and everybody would have a job, and 
everybody’s life would be just wonderful.  They deserve that after 
everything they’ve gone through.  And then here [is important] obviously 
because I live here, and I can’t say that I’m 100 percent completely 
disconnected from what’s going on here because I’ve been here for 16 
years, and whether I like it or not I’m involved. 
 
 I conducted an interview with a 45-year old Albanian man who could not be 
included in the quantitative analysis, because he did not meet study criteria.  However, 
he provided an interesting anecdotal response.  He indicated that he was more 
politically active in the affairs of Montenegro than the United States.  He said,  
Because over there it’s still not right.  Things still need to be done…I don’t 
mean anymore uprising like we did in Kosova through the war.  Now we do 
it through the democratic and human rights channels. 
 
So, while he is from Albania and resides in the United States, he actually felt 
his greatest level of political involvement was in a third state in which he felt a 
strong to ethnic “kin” in need of advocates abroad.  I touch on this theme once 
more in Chapter 7 as it is a recurring anecdotal result throughout the analysis.   
Comparing Conflict and Non-Conflict Group Political Participation 
Scores 
Actual U.S. participation scores for the conflict group spread from 2 to 13 points, 
with the median score being 4.5 and standard deviation of 2.75.  The mean score was 
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5.29.  Sending state scores ranged from 0 to 13 points, with the median score being 3.0.  
The mean score was 3.25, and the standard deviation was 2.78.  United States political 
participation scores for the non-conflict group had a broader range from 0-16.  The 
median score was 5.5, and the mean score was 6.58 with a standard deviation of 4.69.  
Non-conflict group scores for the sending state ranged from 0-7.  The median score was 
2.0, and the mean score was 3.08 with a standard deviation of 2.57.   
Summary of Between-Group Results 
 I summarize between group politic al results in Tables 27 and 28. 
Table 27 - Summary of Political Indicators (Between Group) 
Sending State Indicator Conflict 
Group 
Non-Conflict 
Group 
Gathered Information about Politics 92% 92% 
Voted in Election 20% 0 
Political Party Affiliation 21% 17% 
Contributed Money to Political Candidate/Party 8% 8% 
Contacted Political Figure 17% 8% 
Attempted to Influence Political Opinions 32% 41% 
Mean Political Participation Score 3.25 3.08 
 
Table 28 – Self-Identified Sending State Activity (Between Group) 
Indicator Conflict 
Group 
Non-Conflict 
Group 
More Politically Active in Sending State 0 8% 
Same Activity in Sending and Receiving State 38% 17% 
Sending State Political Issues Most Important 4% 17% 
Sending/Receiving Issues Equally Important 29% 42% 
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 Although outcomes were close, there were some key differences between 
groups.  For one, 20% of the conflict group voted in the sending state, while no one in 
the non-conflict group did.  This supports the hypothesis that conflict migrants will act in 
the sending state more so than non-conflict migrants.  This was interesting considering 
that the non-conflict group displayed nearly double the rate of dual citizenship that the 
conflict group did.  I suggest the non-conflict group had a higher rate of citizenship due 
to confusion within the conflict group over how to maintain citizenship and among 
some, a degree of fear about maintaining citizenship in the home state while it was rife 
with conflict and instability.  The non-conflict group overall appeared to have beer 
better advised of their right to maintain dual citizenship, and they frequently did no to 
support home country property ownership and to maintain a passport for frequent 
travel back to the home state.   
 The conflict group also had a slightly higher rate of sending state political party 
affiliation and contact with sending state political figures.  However, the difference was 
very small.  The “attempted to influence political opinions” indicator produced 
contradictory results for the sending state analysis.  The non-conflict group had a higher 
rate of contact with sending state officials that the non-conflict group.  This coincided 
also to a high rate of contact with U.S. officials regarding sending state issues.  
Anecdotal support overall lent insight to Albanian political contact on behalf of the 
sending state.  For example, a 31-year old male participant described a typical 
interaction,  
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The first step would be to just get in touch with officials, okay.  If we get 
in touch with them, we request further explanation of what do they think 
over certain issues.  If they would give us an explanation, through that 
explanation they give us, we would understand from where they are 
coming from.  And then, maybe we can intervene if they are misled over 
something.  Because what we actually are looking for is just to make sure 
that like the situation is treated fairly, okay. 
For example, the participant mentioned above said,  
Actually it [contact] was during Kosovo conflict, and it was mainly the 
local congressman to try to intervene and pass the resolution to 
intervene in Kosovo, because it was very bad ethnic cleansing. 
 Another participant, a 52 year old Albanian man elaborated on the interaction as 
well.  He said, 
Starting from senators, okay, and the Governor’s office, we have been 
more than six-seven times a year.  And the state level too – senators of 
the state of Michigan, congressmen, all those people…In July we are 
having an event for Gary Peters, and also we’re blessed because Wesley 
Clark is coming to that event.  And actually I got a letter that Gary Peters 
sent, because we have a grievance in Montenegro that is unacceptable…I 
received a [copy of a] letter that he sent to the President and Prime 
Minister of Montenegro. 
An anecdotal interview I conducted with a 45-year old Albanian man provided a 
description of a similar interaction,  
My opinion is that U.S. should get deeply involved to tell them [Albanian 
government] what democracy is in U.S., and to tell them that those 
[Albanian] ethnic groups need to be treated the same in Montenegro.  
That’s why I went with the [U.S.] Congress people in 2005 to 
Montenegro, and we spoke with all high-level Prime Minister and 
President and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro…And that’s why 
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Congressman Eliot Engel came with us and told them that they need to 
have municipality of Tuzi, self-determination for those areas, so they 
need to have full municipality so they can control their own territories, 
their own government, and police…But they can have full municipality of 
Tuzi – that’s major project we got right now. 
 A 46 year old Kosovar woman and her husband owned an Albanian-centric radio 
station for 11 years.  She describes their efforts to influence opinions in the sending and 
receiving state,  
 Me and my husband own radio for 11 years – now we don’t have…A lot 
was going on in Kosova.  I used to read news, and my husband was 
making all the programs, and he was the host.  It was political news.  We 
interview everybody…We met a lot of people here in Michigan and from 
there [Kosovo] too – everybody who came to visit United States, we 
interviewed them.  It was interesting because it was a lot of issues 
discussing a lot of things in community, over there, what going on 
here…My husband say they are fighting and giving their life [Kosovars], 
and we have to do something, and we did that.  We put on the radio all 
those community events, what they were doing, how they helping people 
over there like donating money and clothes and everything to send there 
during the war.  It was big help during the war, especially.  We helped 
them a lot for any kind of information for immigration, health, where 
they can find like free clinics, free doctors.” 
A 24 year old Kosovar woman describes a U.S. protest she attended regarding 
the imprisonment of prisoners in Montenegro, 
The protest was about wanting a fair trial for Montenegrins suspected of 
terrorism in Montenegro – domestic terrorism.  This was a protest for the 
U.S. government to ask Montenegro for a fair trial of the Albanians, who 
three of them were U.S. citizens.  It was a protest in D.C.  We wanted to 
make sure that the U.S. required and asked and pressured the 
Montenegro government to give a fair and speedy trial to the 14 that 
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were accused, three of which were U.S. citizens.  So we were kind of 
riding on those three backs to get the same treatment for all 14. 
As these examples illustrate, the Albanian and Kosovar contact with sending and 
receiving state political officials was less influences by country of origin and more so by 
a shared sense of “cause” around issues affecting not only the home state, but ethnic 
kin in states throughout the sending region.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN – CONCLUSIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS 
Climbing international migration rates and enhanced modes of social and 
political engagement across migrant populations have rendered transnational political 
participation an increasingly salient issue.  International migration has always held 
questions up for scholars’ examination as immigrants have always maintained ties back 
to the homeland via kinship networks, financial remittances, and some political 
influence.  However, widespread allowance of dual citizenship coupled with the up-to-
the minute information gathering and engagement proffered by technological 
advancements allow today’s migrants to assume more organized and influential 
transnational political roles than ever before.  Additionally, this influence challenges our 
notions of political space and traditional definitions of the nation-state as a bounded 
political entity.   
International migration has far-reaching domestic and international policy 
effects, one of which lies in the political decision-making of the migrants themselves.  
Once departed the homeland, do migrants continue to act politically in their sending 
state, or do they abandon their former trappings in order to become engaged in their 
new receiving community?  How do these choices vary depending on the conditions of 
departure?  Specifically, how does transnational political behavior differ between forced 
and voluntary migrants? 
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Wood (1994) suggests that forced and voluntary migrants have similar 
experiences and produce similar patterns of transnational political behavior.  However, 
others (Kunz, 1973; Richmond, 1993, etc.) suggest that the condition of 
“involuntariness” experienced by forced migrants produces both emotional and 
practical effects that steer political practice.  Specifically, sudden departure leaves 
forced migrants with less social and financial capital than voluntary migrants.  They 
typically have not had opportunities to gain the language instruction, job training, or 
access to new networks that normally aid in assimilation and foster later political 
engagement in the receiving community.  As such, I suggest that conflict migrants are 
more likely to participate politically in their sending state than their receiving state post-
resettlement.  I also propose a second hypothesis suggesting that conflict migrants 
participate more than non-conflict migrants in sending state politics post-resettlement.   
In comparing political indicators between two conflict groups and also between 
conflict and non-conflict groups, I found that Levitt et al (2003) most aptly sum up the 
state of transnational practice among today’s many migrant groups.  They write, 
…not all migrants are engaged in transnational practices and that 
those who are, do so with considerable variation in the sectors, levels, 
strength, and formality of their involvement. Similarly, the levels of 
transmigrant activities also vary. The links between migrant associations 
and their home towns, or church-to-church ties between sending and 
receiving communities, are often aimed at establishing very specific and 
local (what some call "translocal") connections. But for some groups, 
transnational practices are no longer about affirming identities to a 
specific place, but instead about their enduring membership in broader 
ethnic, religious or occupational groups… 
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As such, the type and level of transnational activity certainly varied across 
interview participants.  Within my examination of Hypothesis 1, I compared political 
indicators for activity in the sending and receiving state and also a comparison of mean 
participation scores.  To re-summarize the sending and receiving state indicators: 
  Indicator Sending 
State 
Receiving 
State 
Gathered Information about Politics 92% 96% 
Voted in Election 21% 87% 
Political Party Affiliation 21% 70% 
Contributed Money to Political Candidate/Party 8% 33% 
Contacted Political Figure 16% 21% 
Attempted to Influence Political Opinions 33% 36% 
Mean Political Participation Score 3.25 5.29 
 
Indicator Sending State US Same 
More Politically Active Overall* 0 41% 36% 
Political Issues Most Important 4% 67% 29% 
 
These results did not lend support to my hypothesis that conflict migrants would 
participate more in the sending state than in the receiving state.  I think that 
participation was skewed more toward the receiving state for several reasons.  For one, 
conflict participants noted confusion over dual citizenship opportunities, access to 
sending state voting and other mechanisms of sending state participation.  Many simply 
did not know how to participate effectively, even if they had a desire to do so.  Others 
indicated simply that as citizens of the United States, they felt it appropriate, and at 
times necessary, to become a part of the U.S. political structure.   Additionally, there 
were several conflict participants who indicated a desire to withdraw from sending state 
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politics due to the negative associations produced by their conflict experience and a 
general fear and mistrust of the sending state structure.  As Wahlbeck (1999) and Kelly 
(2003) suggest, conflict often destroys and distorts old sending state political ties for 
departed migrants.  And as Frykman (2001) argues, sometimes conflict migrants become 
more involved in the receiving state than the sending state, because they have simply 
had enough.  Open-ended interview responses support these assertions. For example, I 
asked a 25-year old male Bosnian participant, “Do you still feel, in a sense, like a citizen 
of Bosnia?”  He replied,  
Not really, because this is where I live now.  I mean I will always go back 
and everything.  I’m always going to be a Bosnian.  But even though most 
of my [extended] family is there, I’m here with my dad and my mom.  But 
I pretty much grew up here.  I like it here.  I mean I like it there too, but 
it’s too much trauma for my parents there and everything.  I mean we’re 
happy here, you know. 
 
A 46-year old Kosovar woman explained also, 
Because when I lost my country, I left my country.  I wanted to live 
somewhere where it’s more secure, and where my child has a future.  
Getting citizenship, you feel like you belong to that country, and you 
work for that... 
A 35 year old Bosnian woman explained her reasoning for straying away from 
sending state politics as well.  She said,  
I think both [sending and receiving state politics are important], although 
I try to keep myself away as much as I can from Bosnian politics.  All I 
know about Bosnian politics is actually through my husband, because 
he’s the one that keeps up.  I try not to read anything that would kind of 
disturb, and I tell him not to tell me bad things.  He’s sometimes 
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encouraging in his words or discouraging in his words about what is 
happening in Bosnia.  So generally, both, but for some reason it is easier 
for me to be aware of things that happen here than in Bosnia. 
A 50 year old Bosnian woman described her withdrawal as well, highlighting both 
a lack of faith in the “old” system as well as her emotional aversion to remaining 
involved.  She said,   
After I left my country, I made a decision.  I made a promise, and I didn’t 
break it.  I would never watch the news or politics again.  Sometimes my 
husband or my soon try to get me into it, but I am out very fast.  Basically, 
that’s my decision and so far I’ve survived.  For me, watching the TV here is 
a waste of time. I am so used to our old system, it is still in me that I just 
don’t want to.  I tell my husband that if there is a war, then let me know.  
Don’t get me wrong, it doesn’t necessarily mean that I don’t know about 
politics.  I studied it.  I finished law school.  I know how everything functions.  
I am well-informed, but I do not think it is a good thing for my health. 
 
Although the population was too small to draw a representative statistical 
conclusion, most anecdotal withdrawal sentiments were expressed by women.  Mahler 
(83) discusses gendered results when examining transnational activity, “Men may 
dominate transnational fields with respect to women in their households.  Often 
planning activities, taking the lead in transnational overtures, and at times, steering the 
direction of their spouses’ and/or family’s transnational relationships.”  This seemed to 
be the case at times, but more so it seemed to be more closely tied to anxiety over the 
departure experience and a desire to disassociate from the trauma of having endured 
conflict and systemic collapse. 
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Will children of transmigrants opt to forge a transnational life?  How will this 
differ from their parents?  First generation professionals frequently maintain 
transnational social and familial ties, because they have more social and financial capital 
with which to travel back and forth.  (Portes and Rumbault, 2006:26)  Do transnational 
practices vary along generational lines?  But Portes and Rumbaut (1990) suggest that 
cultural practices and values become steadily “whittle away” from generation to 
generation, such that third generation migrants scarcely resemble their grandparents in 
their social, cultural and political practices.   
Portes and Rumbault (2006: 199) suggest that because of the initial 
confrontation of language barriers and cultural differences, first generation immigrants 
often “lack voice.” Nativist campaigns against first generation immigrants often spawn 
retaliatory attitudes in the second generation.  “More attuned to American culture and 
fluent in English, the offspring of immigrants have gained ‘voice’ and have used it to 
reaffirm identities attacked previously with so much impunity.”   
 
However, when examining Kosovar activity in conjunction with Albanian activity, 
transnational efforts were linked more to a shared ethnic status and a desire to right 
perceived wrongs committed against the broader ethnic group or a kin state.  Poulton, 
(1997: 285) defines ”kin state” as “a state composed of and governed by a majority 
community, for which groups who reside outside the state’s sovereign territory 
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maintain a string affinity as a result of shared ethnicity, culture, religion, language or 
perceived history.” 
Where there’s a shared kinship, what else doesn’t matter? 
Shared ethnicity/kinship undermined effects of conflict  
The relationship between country of origin and U.S. political contact was 
significant at x2(3) = .698, p = .011.   
 
Citizenship and Repatriation 
Among Conflict Group participants who were U.S. citizens, reported reasons for 
obtaining U.S. citizenship included the ease of travel and the perceived protection 
afforded by traveling with a U.S. passport.  A 25-year old Bosnian man elaborated “I live 
here – I pretty much grew up here.  I’m Bosnian, but still I mean I grew up here.  It’s my 
country too, now, you know.  And plus, it’s powerful – whenever you go travel, you 
show the U.S. passport, you know, you don’t need no visa or nothing.  They treat you 
differently.” 
However, several participants obtained U.S. citizenship for reasons related to 
their specific circumstance as conflict survivors.  I engaged in several anecdotal 
conversations about “citizenship” and what it’s like to “feel like a citizen” of one country 
or another.  Some participants still felt connected to their homeland as citizens, and 
others felt more detached.  For example, I asked a a 25-year old male Bosnian 
participant, “Do you still feel, in a sense, like a citizen of Bosnia?”  He replied, “Not 
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really, because this is where I live now.  I mean I will always go back and everything.  I’m 
always going to be a Bosnian.  But even though most of my [extended] family is there, 
I’m here with my dad and my mom.  But I pretty much grew up here.  I like it here.  I 
mean I like it there too, but it’s too much trauma for my parents there and everything.  I 
mean we’re happy here, you know.” 
I conducted an anecdotal interview with a 45 year old Albanian male who did not 
meet study criteria, because he migrated to the United States in 1980.  He explained his 
rationale about citizenship status by saying, “That’s the only citizenship I got now, 
because I don’t have any other countries.  I’m not Yugoslavian – I was born in 
Yugoslavia, but I’m Albanian.  And we don’t have no Albanian citizenship in Yugoslavia – 
you have to become Yugoslavian citizenship.”   
 
Technology 
26 year old Bosnian woman started a non-profit after interacting with people she had a 
dialogue with on an Internet website that was “targeting” people from her city.  The site 
included news, photos and a chat forum.  Formal relationships were not far behind.  She 
said,  
We got to know each other pretty well and just started thinking that 
maybe we should start doing something to help out.  And then we got 
some money together and registered the agency as a nonprofit over 
there [in Bosnia].  We’ve been helping – not doing too much – maybe 2-3 
times a year, but we would some money – and work with people that are 
living there to find somebody that needs help. 
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I asked her if the interaction was largely personal or virtual, and she responded, “I see 
them [the other group members] when I’m in Bosnia.  I’m there almost every 
summer…But it’s been really challenging because everything that we do is online.  If 
want to meet to make a decision, we’re on the MSN Messenger talking to each other.”  
Members of their group hail from the United States, Western Europe, Australia and 
Canada.   I asked her whether she considered the group to be politically active in Bosnia.  
She said, “Well we’re trying to be not political at all.  We don’t want to get involved in 
that.” 
30 year old Bosnian Male :  Do you ever send money back to support any 
projects in your home country? 
 
Not really.  I support only – it’s a group called – it’s not political, but it’s 
like young people basically – it’s a movement – Revolt.  It’s on Facebook – 
I can send you some or email you.  Just find me, my first name and last 
name, and then Detroit, and that’s where it is.  It’s just basically young 
people criticizing all this bullshit that’s going on as far as politics on there, 
you know, like police doing what the fuck they wanna do, politicians 
doing what the fuck they wanna do, you know, this and that.  You know, 
they want a little bit better for the people, I guess, start moving forward 
basically.  It’s basically people in Bosnia, just throughout the whole 
Bosnia.  Like it’s young people, between 18-30, maybe, you see what I’m 
saying?  It’s basically what they do is criticize all this, you know, they 
want a little bit better for the people.  Like crimes, this and that, like 
police not doing nothing about it.  They’re not putting in so much work as 
they should and stuff like that. 
 
Anecdotal Bosnian man over 50 
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I offend them at least once a week…They have nightmares.  I make sure 
that they’re not comfortable.  We established an organization, and it was 
established during the war.  I wouldn’t call it dissident because dissidents, 
they fight.   I don’t know how to define it – we are not struggling to take 
power.  All what we are doing, we are trying to politically educate 
Bosnians so that they have an understanding of what is taking place.  Part 
of the culture is that anything what is going on national level is decide by 
the powers – USA power, that power, this power…So we developed a 
game.  Whenever they [state powers] would make a move, we would just 
explain [to Bosnians] what it means…We do that through the Internet.  
We have two lists – one is in English, the other is in Bosnian.  And in 
English, it is not just Bosnians – it is for American public.   
 
Goldring elaborates further, “…transnational social fields, and localities of origin in particular, 
provide a special context in which people can improve their social position, and perhaps their 
power, make claims about their changing status and have it appropriately valorized, and also 
participate in changing their place of origin so that it becomes more consistent with their 
changing expectations and statuses…” (Goldring, 1998: 167) this has been shown to lend 
leverage to leaders who are able to succeed in a transnational space more so than the 
community of origin.   
 
Future Directions 
Communist/failed state 
Political space/place 
Refugee status matters w Bosnians, not as much w Kosovars… 
 
Portes et al 1999 AS QUOTED IN KIVISTO 2001….”Those with higher levels of 
social capital would be more likely to forge transnational linkages than those with less 
capital…
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Despite globalization’s destabilization of the notion of states as free-standing entities, 
Glick Schiller et al (1992) point out that the nation-state persists as the primary 
structure by which we organize and govern.   Brubaker (1996: 14) defines a nation as 
“collective individuals capable of coherent, purposeful collective action.”  
Conceptualizing transnationalism requires developing some understanding of nationalist 
loyalty as an organizing principle, even when those loyalties transcend traditional state 
boundaries.  To be sure, even in a transnational existence, action is formed first around 
the national, whether encouraged by the state or sought out by the individual.  
Brubaker (1996: 5) writes of “transborder nationalisms” as being these “external 
national homelands” that establish obligations and responsibilities transcendent of 
geographic boundaries and legal citizenship.   Yet, globalization and transnationalism do 
challenge traditional concepts of the nation-state.  Questions of jurisdiction, over-
lapping institutions and citizenship are not easily answered. 
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Appendix A – Hypothesis One Correlation Tables 
 
Conflict Group: U.S. Political Information Gathering 
Control Cramer’s V 
Significant if 
p<.01 
Lambda 
Significant if 
p<.05 
df 
Sending State .480 .137 .250 .140 3 
Gender .348 .406 .091 .827 3 
Religion .457 .123 .250 .064 6 
Age at Interview .478 .140 .333 .363 3 
 
Conflict Group: Sending State Political Information Gathering 
Control Cramer’s V Significance Lambda Significance df 
Sending State .299 .543 .000 n/a 3 
Gender .617 .028 .545 .090 3 
Religion .520 .043 .250 .064 6 
Age at 
Interview 
.602 .039 .300 .261 3 
 
Conflict Group: U.S. Voting 
Control 
Chi-Square 
Cramer’s V 
Significant if > Lambda 
Significant if 
<.05 
df 
Sending State .014 .907 n/a n/a 1 
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Gender .755 .385 n/a n/a 1 
Religion .257 .468 .000 n/a 2 
Age at Interview .491 .484 n/a n/a 1 
 
Conflict Group: Sending State Voting 
Control Chi Square/ 
Cramer’s V 
Significance Lambda Significance df 
Sending State .505 .477 n/a n/a 1 
Gender .511 .475 n/a n/a 1 
Religion .266 .428 .000 n/a 2 
Age at 
Interview 
.253 .615 n/a n/a 
1 
 
Conflict Group: Receiving State Political Party 
Control Chi Square/ 
Cramer’s V 
Significance Lambda Significance df 
Sending State     1 
Gender .509 .476   1 
Religion .278 .394 .000 n/a 2 
Age at 
Interview 
0202 .653   
1 
 
Conflict Group: Sending State Political Party 
Control Chi Square/ Significance Lambda Significance df 
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Cramer’s V 
Sending State .505 .477   1 
Gender .087 .769   1 
Religion .266 .428 .000 n/a 2 
Age at 
Interview 
2.274 .132   
1 
 
Conflict Group: Receving State Political Contribution 
Control Chi Square/ 
Cramer’s V 
Significance Lambda Significance df 
Sending State      
Gender      
Religion      
Age at 
Interview 
    
 
 
Conflict Group: Sending State Political Contribution 
Control Chi Square/ 
Cramer’s V 
Significance Lambda Significance df 
Sending State      
Gender      
Religion      
Age at 
Interview 
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Conflict Group: Influence U.S. Political Opinions 
Control Chi Square/ 
Cramer’s V 
Significance Lambda Significance df 
Country of 
Origin 
.395 .441 .125 .307 
4 
Gender .365 .527 .273 .307 4 
Religion .473 .216 .250 1.852 8 
Age at 
Interview 
.516 .171 .333 .337 
4 
 
Conflict Group: Influence Sending State Political Opinions 
Control Chi Square/ 
Cramer’s V 
Significance Lambda Significance df 
Country of 
Origin 
.464 .161 .250 .307 
3 
Gender .365 .363 .273 .244 3 
Religion .427 .188 .250 .244 6 
Age at 
Interview 
.421 .236 .250 .064 
3 
 
Correlation Tests:  Politically Active Before or After Migration 
Control Cramer’s V Significance Lambda Significance df 
Country of Origin .581 .222 .250 .559 3 
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Gender .380 .599 .200 .652 3 
Religion .884 .118 .571 .067 6 
Age at Interview .527 .307 .000 n/a 3 
 
Correlation Tests:  Politically Active in Sending or Receiving State 
Control Cramer’s V Significance Lambda Significance df 
Country of Origin .079 .928 .000 n/a 2 
Gender .495 .053 .273 .487 2 
Religion .241 .594 .000 .000 4 
Age at Interview .310 .315 .250 .163 0 
 
Correlation Tests:  Sending or Receiving State Issues Most Important 
Control Cramer’s V Significance Lambda Significance df 
Country of 
Origin 
     
Gender      
Religion      
Age at Interview      
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Appendix B – Hypothesis Two Correlation Tables 
 
Sending State Political Issues are Important to Me 
Control Cramer’s V Significance Lambda Significance df 
Conflict/Non-
Conflict Group  
.138 .708 .000 n/a 1 
      
      
      
 
Sending State Foreign Policy is Important to Me 
Control Chi-Square Significance Lambda Significance df 
Conflict/Non-
Conflict Group  
2.250 .134 .000 n/a 1 
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Appendix C – Instrumentation 
 
Transnational Political Behavior among Diasporic Migrants 
Face-to-Face Interview Guide 
Wayne State University 
 
Hello, my name is Amanda Hanlin, and I am a student at Wayne State University.  I am trying to 
learn more about how people born in other countries adjust to living in the United States.  I am 
hoping you can help me by answering some questions about your views on citizenship and 
politics both in the United States and in your home country. 
 
Before we begin, I just wanted to go over some important points.  First, this interview is 
completely voluntary.  You can refuse to participate, and you do not have to answer any 
questions you do not want to answer.  You can end this interview at any time.  Also, your 
answers will be kept completely confidential.  I will not use your name at all when I review the 
results of the interview.   
 
I would like to first as you some questions about your background. 
 
1.  CODE WITHOUT ASKING         Male   1  Female   2 
 
2.  In what city and country were you born? 
 
3.  Would you consider the town in which you were born to be URBAN or RURAL? 
 
Urban 1 
Rural 2 
Suburb 3 
Don’t know 4 
 
4.  In what city and country were you at the time that you first migrated? 
 
5.  Would you consider the town in which you were at the time of your migration to be URBAN 
or RURAL? 
 
Urban 1 
Rural 2 
Suburb 3 
Don’t know 4 
 
6.  What year did you come to the United States? 
 
7.  Have you lived in the United States ever since [year]? 
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Yes 1 
No 2 
 
8. Which of these categories best describes your status when you came to the U.S. in [date]? 
 
Permanent Resident   1 
Temporary Resident   2 
Without Papers    3 
Temporary Work Visa   4 
Student Visa    5 
Tourist Visa    6 
Dependent on someone else’s visa 7 
Expired visa    8 
Asylee     9 
Temporary Protected Immigrant (TPS) 10 
Other (specify) ___________  11 
 
9.  Are you a U.S. citizen currently? 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
 
If yes  9a.  What year did you become a U.S. citizen?   
 
If yes  9b. How long did it take you to obtain citizenship (in years)? 
 
If yes  9c.  Why did you decide to pursue U.S. citizenship? 
 
If no   9d.  Do you plan to become a U.S. citizen? 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
 
Open-ended follow up    9e.  Why or why not? 
 
10.  Are you still a citizen of your home country? 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
 
11.  Do you still own property in your home country? 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
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12. Since you left your home country, how many times have you been back to visit? 
 
13.  How many of your parents still live in your home country?  
 
14.  How many of your parents live in the United States? 
 
15.  How many of your children live in your home country? 
 
16.  How many of your children live in the United States? 
 
17.  How many of your brothers and sisters currently live in your home country? 
 
18.  How many of your brothers and sisters currently live in the United States? 
19.  How about your friends?  Would you say that you have more friends living in the U.S. or 
living in your home country?  
 
More in U.S.    1 
More in home country   2 
About the same in both locations 3 
Don’t know    4 
 
20. Since you moved to the US, have you sent money back to friends or family in your home 
country? 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
 
If yes   20a. About how often? 
 
Once only    1 
Every one or two years  2 
About once a year  3 
More than once a year  4 
Don't Know   98 
Refused   99 
 
21.  Do you ever send money back to support any projects in your home country? 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
 
If yes   21a. About how often? 
 
Once only    1 
Every one or two years  2 
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About once a year  3 
More than once a year  4 
Don't Know   98 
Refused   99 
 
22. In your own words, please tell me why you decided to move to the United States. 
 
23.  If you had to pick the statement that most fits your PRIMARY reason for relocating to the 
United States, which of these categories best describes the PRIMARY reason why you came to 
the United States?  Please choose only one response. 
 
To find work    1 
To reunite with family   2 
To get an education   3 
To get a “better life” overall  4 
Fled from conflict   5 
Fled political persecution  6 
Fled religious persecution  7 
Other (please specify)   8 
 
24.  Using the same series of statements, what (if any) would be the next best statement to 
describe what most influenced you to move to the United States? Please choose only one 
response. 
 
To find work    1 
To reunite with family   2 
To get an education   3 
To get a “better life” overall  4 
Fled from conflict   5 
Fled political persecution  6 
Fled religious persecution  7 
Other (please specify)   8 
 
25. Would you ever consider moving back to your home country? 
 
25a. Why or why not? 
 
Now I’d like to ask for your thoughts and opinions about things related to politics and 
citizenship.  Please remember that there are no right or wrong answers.  I’m really just 
interested in listening to your opinions in your own words.    
 
26.  Are there any political issues that are important to you?  Can you tell me about them? 
 
27.  Would you say you were a more politically active person before or after you migrated to the 
United States? 
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Before      1 
After      2 
About the same  level of involvement in both 3 
Was never politically active   4 
Don’t know     5 
 
27a. How come? 
 
28. Today, are you more politically active with regard to U.S. political affairs or the political 
affairs of your home country? 
 
U.S.      1 
Home Country     2 
About the same  level of involvement in both 3 
Not active in either    4 
Don’t know     5 
 
28a. How come? 
 
29.  Which political events (elections, policy change, etc.) are more important to you currently – 
those of the United States, or those of your home country? 
 
U.S.    1 
Home Country   2 
About the same  importance 3 
Neither are important to me 4 
Don’t know   5 
 
29a. How come? 
 
30.  Do you take interest in US foreign policy with regard to your home country?  
 
If yes   30a.Can you tell me a little bit about what interests you?   
 
Now, I'd like to ask you how often you have participated in certain political and community 
activities.  For all of these, just give me your best estimate, and don't worry that you might not 
remember the exact number of times you participated in each activity.  
 
31. Since you relocated to the United States, have you contacted any political figure (elected 
official, bureaucrat, local leader, etc.) in the United States to relay your views on some issue? 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
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If yes   31a.  How often would you say you did this? 
 
Once only   1 
Every one or two years  2 
About once a year  3 
More than once a year  4 
Don't Know   98 
Refused   99 
 
31b.    Can you tell me more about this interaction in your own words? 
 
32. Since you relocated to the United States, have you contacted any political figure (elected 
official, bureaucrat, local leader, etc.) in your home country to relay your views on some issue? 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
 
If yes   32a.  How often would you say you did this? 
 
Once only   1 
Every one or two years  2 
About once a year  3 
More than once a year  4 
Don't Know   98 
Refused   99 
 
32b. Can you tell me more about this interaction in your own words? 
 
33.   Do you identify yourself with any U.S. political party? 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
 
If yes    33a.  Would you say you are... 
  
Democrat  1 
Republican  2 
Independent  3 
Other (please specify) 4 
Don’t Know  98 
Refused  99 
 
34.  Do you identify yourself with any political party in your home country? 
 
Yes 1 
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No 2 
 
If yes    34a.  Which party would that be? 
  
35. Since you relocated to the United States, have you contributed money to U.S. political 
candidates or parties? 
 
Yes  1 
No  2 
Not sure 98 
Refused 99 
 
If yes   35a.  How often would you say you did this? 
 
Once only    1 
Every one or two years  2 
About once a year  3 
More than once a year  4 
Don't Know   98 
Refused   99 
 
36. Since you relocated to the United States, have you contributed money to political candidates 
or parties in your home country? 
 
Yes  1 
No  2 
Not sure 98 
Refused 99 
 
If yes   36a.  How often would you say you did this? 
 
Once only   1 
Every one or two years  2 
About once a year  3 
More than once a year  4 
Don't Know   98 
Refused   99 
 
37. Since you relocated to the United States, have you voted in any local, state or federal U.S 
election? 
 
Yes  1 
No  2 
Not sure 98  
Refused 99 
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If yes   37a.  How often would you say you did this? 
 
Once only   1 
Every one or two years  2 
About once a year  3 
More than once a year  4 
Don't Know   98 
Refused   99 
 
38. Since you relocated to the United States, have you voted in any election in your home 
country? 
 
Yes  1 
No  2 
Not sure 98 
Refused 99 
 
If yes   38a.  How often would you say you did this? 
 
Once only   1 
Every one or two years  2 
About once a year  3 
More than once a year  4 
Don't Know   98 
Refused   99 
 
39. Since you relocated to the United States, have you used any of these means to influence 
anyone’s opinions about politics?  In this case, I’m interested in how you’ve communicated with 
people living in the United States. Please select ALL that apply. 
 
Letter     1       
Email     2       
Internet Blog    3       
Phone Call    4      
Boycott some business or product 5  
Other (please specify)   6   
 
39a. Can you tell me a little bit more about that? 
 
40. Since you relocated to the United States, have you used any of these means to influence 
people’s opinions about politics?  In this case, I’m interested in how you’ve communicated with 
people living in your home country.  Please select ALL that apply. 
 
Letter     1       
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Email     2       
Internet Blog    3       
Phone Call    4      
Boycott some business or product 5  
Other (please specify)   6   
 
40a. Can you tell me a little bit more about that? 
 
41.  Can you tell me in your own words about any other ways you have participated in political 
activities in the United States since you moved here? 
 
42.  How about in your home country?  Can you tell me about any other ways you have 
participated in political activities in your home country since you moved here? 
 
43. Do you interact with any civic, cultural or social organizations? These can be based in the 
United States or in your home country. 
 
Yes 1 
No 2 
 
If yes   43a. Which ones? 
If yes   43b.  Can you tell me more about your involvement? 
 
44. Are there any organizations that supported your move to the United States? 
 
Yes  1 
No  2 
Not sure 98 
Refused 99 
 
If yes  (44a) Which ones? 
If yes  (44b) In what way did they support you? 
 
 
45.  How do you gather information about U.S. politics? Please select all that apply. 
 
Public information (radio, newspaper, television, websites, etc.)  1 
Friends and/or family       2 
Community Organizations      3 
Other (please specify)       4 
I do not gather information about U.S. politics    5 
 
If yes  (45a) Can you be more specific about those sources? 
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46.  How do you gather information about politics in your home country? Please select all that 
apply. 
 
Public information (radio, newspaper, television, websites, etc.)  1 
Friends and/or family       2 
Community Organizations      3 
Other (please specify)       4 
I do not gather information about politics in my home country  5 
 
If yes  (46a) Can you be more specific about those sources? 
 
47. If you belong to a particular religion or faith, what is it? 
  
1. Baptist 
2. Buddhist 
3. Christian (Protestant, Catholic, Roman Catholic, Greek, Orthodox, Mormon, etc.) 
4. Hindu 
5. Jewish 
6. Muslim 
7.  Agnostic 
8.  Atheist 
9. Religious, but does not belong to a particular religion 
10. No religion 
11. Other religion (SPECIFY) 
 
48.  What is the highest grade or year of school or college you completed in your home country? 
 
No formal schooling  99 
Elementary School (1-5)  1 
Middle School (6-8)  2 
High School (9-12)  3 
1 year of college  4 
2 years of college  5 
3 years of college  6 
4 years of college  7 
5 or more years of college 8 
 
If advanced study  48a. What was your course of study? 
 
49. How many years of school have you completed in the United States? 
 
No U.S. schooling        99 
Attended some schooling in U.S. but didn’t complete a grade or year  0 
Elementary School (1-5)        1 
Middle School (6-8)        2 
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High School (9-12)        3 
1 year of college        4 
2 years of college        5 
3 years of college        6 
4 years of college        7 
5 or more years of college       8 
 
If advanced study  49a. What was your course of study? 
 
50.  When you first moved to the United States, did you speak English? 
 
Yes  1 
No  2 
 
51.  How would you describe your current employment status? 
 
Working    1 
Looking for work   2 
Keeping house    3 
Going to school    4 
Unable to work    5 
Retired     6 
Other ___________________  7  
 
52.  What is your annual salary at this job in US dollars? 
 
Unemployed    0 
Less than $25,000   1 
$25,000 to $35,000   2 
$35,000 to $45,000   3 
$45,000to $55,000    4 
$55,000 to $65,000   5 
$65,000 or more   6 
 
53.  How would you describe your employment status before you left your home country? 
 
Working    1 
Looking for work   2  
Keeping house    3 
Going to school    4 
Unable to work    5 
Retired     6 
Other ___________________  7 
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54.  What was your annual salary in US dollars at the time that you left this job in your home 
country? 
 
Unemployed    0 
Less than $25,000   1 
$25,000 to $35,000   2 
$35,000 to $45,000   3 
$45,000to $55,000    4 
$55,000 to $65,000   5 
$65,000 or more   6 
 
55.  What year were you born?      
 
56.  What is your current marital status? 
 
Single  1 
Married 2  
Widow  3 
Other  4 
 
57.  Can you suggest other people who maybe willing to be contacted for interview? 
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Appendix D – Study Recruitment Materials 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
As a doctoral candidate in Wayne State University’s (WSU) Department of Political Science, I am 
conducting a study to better understand how individuals born outside of the United States view 
and participate in politics here and abroad.  I am gathering research information by interviewing 
individuals who relocated to Metropolitan Detroit from other countries. 
Your insights on these issues are important, and so I hope to include you as a participant in this 
study.  I am asking to schedule a personal interview with you at a location of your choice.  The 
interview will last approximately thirty minutes and will be of no financial cost to you.  Your 
interview responses will be kept completely confidential and reported in aggregate for research 
purposes only.  Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you may withdraw at any time.   
I will contact you again within the next few days.  In the meantime, if you have any questions or 
concerns, please contact me directly at 313-516-9633 or achanlin@wayne.edu.  I really look 
forward to speaking with you, and I hope I can count on your participation. 
Thank you for your consideration. 
Sincerely, 
 
Amanda Hanlin 
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[ALBANIAN] 
 
I nderuar Zoteri/Zonje 
 
Si nje kandidate per te mbrojtur Doktoraturen ne Shkenca Politike ne Universitetin Wayne State, 
une jam duke bere nje studim per te kuptuar me mire, se si individet e lindur jashte Shteteve te 
Bashkuara te Amerikes marrin pjese ne politiken Amerikane dhe ate jashte saj. Une po mbledh 
informacione kerkimore duke intervistuar personat e ardhur ne Detroit.  
Mendimet tuaja per keto ceshtje jane te rendesishme prandaj dhe une shpresoj qe dhe ju te 
merrni pjese ne kete studim. Po kerkoj qe te leme nje takim se bashku, ne vendin qe deshironi 
ju, per nje interviste personale (bisede). Intervista do te zgjase per rreth 30 minuta, dhe nuk do 
te kete asnje kosto financiare per ju. Pergjigjet tuaja do te jene konfidenciale, dhe do te 
raportohen ne grumbull per qellime kerkimore. Pjesemarrja juaj ne kete fushe eshte vullnetare, 
dhe ju mund ta lini intervisten ne c’do momement qe deshironi. 
Une do t’ju kontaktoj perseri ne ditet e ardhshme. Nderkohe, ne qofte se keni ndonje pyetje apo 
shqetesim, ju lutem me kontaktoni ne Nr. e telefonit 313-516-9633 ose achanlin@wayne.edu. 
Une me te vertete mezi po pres te flas me ju dhe shpresoj qe te jeni te pranishem. 
Faleminderit per konsideraten. 
Sinqerisht, 
 
Amanda Hanlin 
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[BOSNIAN] 
 
Draga Sir/Madam, 
 
Kao doktorski kandidat na Wayne State University (WSU) Odsjek političkih nauka, ja  provodim  
studije u cilju boljeg razumijevanja političkih gledišta pojedinaca rođenih izvan Sjedinjenih 
Američkih Država  i njihovog političkog sudjelovanja ovdje i u inostranstvu. Ja prikupljam 
istraživacke informacije  intervjuisanjem  pojedinaca  koji su se doselili u Detroit Metropolitan iz 
drugih zemalja. 
Vaša uvid u ova pitanja je važan, te se  nadam da ću Vas  uključiti kao sudionika u ovoj studiji. 
Željela bih zakazati intervju s Vama na mjestu  po Vašem izboru. Intervju će trajati otprilike 
trideset minuta i bez ikakvih  financijskih  troškova za Vas.Vaši odgovori tokom intervjua će biti 
potpuno povjerljivi i prikupljeni  samo za istraživačke svrhe. Vaše sudjelovanje u ovoj studiji je 
dobrovoljno i možete se povući u bilo koje vrijeme. 
Ponovo ću Vas kontaktirati u roku od nekoliko sljedećih dana. U međuvremenu, ako imate bilo 
kakvih pitanja ili nedoumica, kontaktirajte me direktno na 313-516-9633 ili  
achanlin@wayne.edu.  Unaprijed se radujem razgovoru s Vama i nadam se da mogu računati na  
Vaše sudjelovanje.   
S poštovanjem, 
 
Amanda Hanlin 
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Research Study Recruitment Flyer 
Title of Study: Transnational Political Behavior among Diasporic Migrants 
 
Purpose:  
This is a research study that seeks to learn more about how families from other countries adjust to living 
in the United States.  Specifically, we are interested in understanding more about U.S. immigrants’ civic 
and political behavior. 
 
Who is doing the study? 
The Principal Investigator for this study is Amanda Hanlin. She is a doctoral candidate in the Department 
of Political Science at Wayne State University.  She can be reached at 313-555-1212 or 
myemailaddress@wayne.edu.  
 
Who is sponsoring the study? 
This study is being conducted at Wayne State University.  The study is not funded, and it is being done for 
the purposes of completing a doctoral dissertation.   
 
Why am I being asked to participate? 
You are being asked to participate because you are an adult over the age of 18 who relocated to the 
United States from another country.   
 
Why should I participate? 
As a participant in this research study there will be no direct benefit to you, and you will not be paid to 
participate.  However, information from this study may benefit other people by creating new knowledge 
about how foreign-born people adjust to life in the United States and the special needs and challenges 
they have when participating in political systems here and in their home country.  There are no known 
risks to you in participating, and there is no cost to participate.  Your identity will be kept strictly 
confidential, and you will only be identified by a code name or number. 
 
What am I being asked to do? 
If you agree to take part in this research study, you will be asked to participate in one 30-60 minute in-
person interview with a Wayne State University doctoral student. The student will interview you at a 
location of your choice, and she will ask questions about your political participation habits in the United 
States and your country of origin. You do not have to answer any interview questions that you do not 
want to answer, and you may conclude the interview at any time. 
 
How Can I Get Involved? 
If you are willing to participate, or if you know others who may be willing to participate, please contact 
Amanda Hanlin at (313) 555-1212 or myemailaddress@wayne.edu. 
 
Thank you for your assistance with this important research study! 
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Ftese rekrutimi per nje studim kerkimor 
Titulli i Studimit: Sjellja reth Politikes Nderkombetare midis te ardhurve nga Diaspora 
 
Qellimi: Ky eshte nje studim kerkimor qe ka per qellim te mesoje me shume se si familjet e ardhura nga 
vende te tjera pershtaten me jeten ne Shtetet e Bashkuara te Amerikes. Ne vecanti, ne jemi te interesuar 
te kuptojme me shume per jeten qytetare dhe sjelljen politike te emigranteve Amerikane. 
 
Kush po e ben kete studim? 
Studiuesi kryesor ne kete studim eshte Amanda Hanlin. Ajo eshte nje Kandidate per doktorature ne 
Departamentin e Shkencave Politike ne Universitetin Wayne State. Ajo mund te gjendet ne numrin e 
telefonit 313-555-1212 ose myemailaddress@wayne.edu. 
 
Kush e sponsorizon kete studim? 
Ky studim bo zhvillohet ne Universitetin Wayne State. Per kete studim nuk ka fonde, dhe po behet me 
qellim per kompletimin e tezes te doktoratures. 
 
Perse po me kekohet te marr pjese? 
Juve po ju kerkohet qe te merrni pjese sepse ju jeni mbi moshen 18 vjet, dhe keni ardhur ne Amerike nga 
nje vend tjeter. 
 
Perse duhet te marr pjese? 
Si nje pjesemarres ne kete studim ju nuk do te keni asnje perfitim direct, dhe ju nuk do te paguheni qe te 
merrni pjese. Megjithate, informacioni nga ky studim mund te jete me vlere per njerez te tjere, te lindur 
ne vende jashte Amerikes, duke krijuar njohuri te reja reth pershtatjes te emigranteve ne Amerike dhe 
pjesemarrjes te tyre ne systemet politike Amerikane dhe vendit prej nga ata kane ardhur. Nuk ka asnje 
rrezik te njohur ne lidhje me pjesemarrjen tuaj, dhe nuk do te keni asnje detyrim financiar per 
pjesemarrjen tuaj ne kete studim. Identiteti tuaj do te rruhet rreptesisht, dhe ju do te identifikoheni me 
nje emer te koduar ose me nje numer. 
 
Cfare po me kerkohet te bej? 
Ne qofte se bini dakord te merrni pjese ne kete studim kerkimor, do te ju kerkohet te merrni pjese ne nje 
interviste personale me nje student nga Universiteti Wayne State, qe do te zgjase per rreth 30-60 
minuata. Studenti do ju intervistoje ne nje vend te zjedhur prej jush, dhe do tju beje pyetje rreth menyres 
qe merrni pjese ne politike ne Shtetet e Bashkuara te Amerikes dhe ne vendin e origjines suaj. Ju nuk jeni 
te detyruar aspak qe ti pergjigjeni asnje pyetjeje  qe nuk deshironi, dhe mund ta mbyllni intervisten ne cdo 
moment. 
 
Si mundem te marr pjese? 
Ne qofte se deshironi te merrni pjese, ose ne qofte se njihni te tjere qe kane deshire te marrin pjese, ju 
lutem kontaktoni Amanda Hanlin ne 313-555-1212 ose myemaladdress@wayne.edu. 
 
Ju faleminderit per ndihmen tuaj ne kete studim kerkimor te rendesishem! 
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Naucno-istrazivacki upitnik 
Tema: Promjene u politickom ponasanju medju imigrantima u dijaspori 
 
Cilj istrazivanja:  
Ovo istazivanje ima za cilj da ustanovi kako se porodice  proijeklom iz drugih zemalja prilagodjavaju zivotu 
u SAD. Poseban cilj je bolje upoznavnje drustvenog i politickog ponasanja imiganata u SAD.  
 
Ko sprovodi ovo istrazivanje?  
Glavni istrazivac je Amanda Hanlin, kadidat za doktora nauka na odjeljenju za politicke nauke na Wayane 
State Univezitetu. Njen kontakt tlefon je (313) 555-1212, myemailaddress@wayne.edu.  
 
Ko finansira istrazivanje?  
Istrazivanje se provodi u sklopu nastavnog programa na Wayne State Univerzitetu. Studija nema 
finansijsku potporu, vec je dio doktorske disertacije kandidata Amande Hanlin.  
 
Zasto vas pozivamo da ucestrvujete u ovom isttazivanju? 
Vi ste zamoljeni da ucestvujete u ovom istrazivanju jer ste odrasla osoba starija od 18 godina koja je 
imigrirala u SAD iz druge zemlje.  
 
Zasto treba da ucestvujete u ovom istrazivanju?  
Iako necete biti placeni da ucestvujete u ovom istrazivanju, informacije prikupljene u toku ovog 
istrazivanja ce  rezultirati u prikupljanju znanja o ljudima rodjenim izvan SAD i njihovim specificnim 
portrebama i izazovima sa kojima se susrecu u ostvarenju svojih politickih prava i obaveza  u SAD i u 
njihovim zemljama porijekla.. Ovo istraivanje je anonimno, i identitet ucesnika u ovom istrazivanju je 
zasticen. Svi odgovori ce biti oznaceni sifrom.  
 
Sta se ocekuje od vas? 
Ukoliko pristanete da ucestvujete u ovom istrazivanju, ucestvovacete u 30-60 minutnom razgovoru sa 
kandidatom za doktora nauka, Amandom Hanlin.  
 
Razgovor ce biti obavljen na lokaciji koju vi odaberete. Ona ce vam postavljati pitanja o vasem ucescu u 
politickom procesu u SAD i u vasoj zemlji porijekla. Ne morate odgovoriti na pitanja koja ne zelite da 
odgovorite i mozete prekinuti razgovor kad god zazelite.  
 
Kako  se mozete ukljuciti u ovaj projekat? 
Ukoliko ste zainteresovani da ucestvujete u ovom istrazivanju ili znate nekoga ko je zainteresovan za isti, 
molim Vas da uspostavite kontakt sa Amandom Hanlin na telefon (313) 555-1212, 
myemailaddress@wayne.edu. 
 
Unaprijed se zahvaljujemo na pomoci u ovom istrazivanju! 
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Appendix E – Participant Information Sheet 
 
Research Information Sheet 
Title of Study: Transnational Political Behavior among Diasporic Migrants 
 
 
Principal Investigator (PI):  Amanda Hanlin 
     Wayne State University, Political Science 
     313-555-1212 
myemailaddress@wayne.edu 
Purpose 
You are being asked to be in a research study of civic and political behavior among U.S. 
immigrants because you relocated to the United States from another country. This study is 
being conducted at Wayne State University.  The estimated number of study participants to be 
enrolled at Wayne State University is about sixty (60). Please read this form and ask any 
questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study. 
 
In this research study, you are being asked to participate in an in-person interview with a 
Doctoral student from Wayne State University.  This study is being conducted with the hope of 
better understanding political participation.  These interviews are a chance for individuals to tell 
us about their involvement in political and civic activities.  The purpose of the interview is to 
help us better understand how international migrants might participate politically in affairs in 
the United States as well as their country of origin. 
 
Study Procedures 
If you agree to take part in this research study, you will be asked to participate in one 30-60 
minute in-person interview with a Wayne State University doctoral student.  
 
The student will report to a location of your choice for one 30-60 minute interview. 
There will only be one interview, lasting 30-60 minutes. 
The student will ask you questions about your political participation habits in the United States 
and your country of origin. You do not have to answer any interview questions that you do not 
want to answer, and you may conclude the interview at any time. 
 Your responses will be kept completely confidential, meaning we will not share your name with 
anyone.  Your interview responses will not be linked with your identity in any way. 
 
Benefits  
As a participant in this research study, there will be no direct benefit for you; however, 
information from this study may benefit other people now or in the future. 
 
Risks  
There are no known risks at this time to participation in this study.  
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Study Costs  
Participation in this study will be of no cost to you. 
 
 
Compensation  
You will not be paid for taking part in this study. 
 
Confidentiality 
All information collected about you during the course of this study will be kept confidential. You 
will be identified in the research records by a code name or number. There will be no list that 
links your identity with this code. 
 
Voluntary Participation/Withdrawal 
Taking part in this study is voluntary.  You have the right to choose not to take part in this study. 
If you decide to take part in the study you can later change your mind and withdraw from the 
study.  You are free to only answer questions that you want to answer.  You are free to 
withdraw from participation in this study at any time.  Your decisions will not change any 
present or future relationship with Wayne State University or its affiliates, or other services you 
are entitled to receive. 
 
Questions 
If you have any questions about this study now or in the future, you may contact Amanda Hanlin 
or one of at the following phone number 313-555-1212. If you have questions or concerns about 
your rights as a research participant, the Chair of the Human Investigation Committee can be 
contacted at (313) 577-1628. If you are unable to contact the research staff, or if you want to 
talk to someone other than the research staff, you may also call (313) 577-1628 to ask questions 
or voice concerns or complaints.  
 
Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
By completing the interview, you are agreeing to participate in this study.   
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Appendix F - Human Investigation Committee (HIC) 
Documents 
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ABSTRACT 
 
TRANSNATIONAL PARTICIPATIOPN AMONG DIASPORIC MIGRANTS 
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Advisor: Dr. Kevin Deegan-Krause 
 
Major:  Political Science 
 
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Contemporary migrants participate in a variety of dual social, political, and 
economic processes. Sending and receiving states overtly encourage transnational 
practices when they allow migrants to maintain homeland citizenship regardless of their 
citizenship status in their receiving communities. Yet, we know little about migrants’ 
ability to enact their citizenship and their propensity to participate in sending and 
receiving state networks and structures. We  know also that diasporas experience and 
shape transnational spaces differently than other migrants, but we have much to learn 
about what influences a diaspora’s desire and ability to maintain a political affiliation 
with their homeland and to become politically incorporated in their receiving 
community 
What does having a transnational existence mean for a diaspora’s desire and 
ability to become politically active? Do diasporas have opportunities to act within 
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networks in one or both of their affiliated communities? And if opportunities are 
present, do they seek to participate or to withdraw? I approach transnationalism as a 
site of dual-state and extra-state political engagement, and examine how differences in 
sending conditions hold political significance for the individual, the community, and the 
state. I gathered data via face-to-face interviews with forty participants – Albanians, 
Bosnians and Kosovars who migrated to the United States in 1995 or later. I measured 
type, mode and frequency of transnational political activity and assigned scores to a 
spectral typology of action, including: avoidance, awareness, engagement and activism. 
Within this, I observe how transnational political activity is influenced by various 
independent variables. 
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